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PREFACE
This research tf'as initiated while I was teaching mathematics and
statistic~ courses to first year students in 'service-courses' at
the University of the Witwatersrand. I wal5concerned that many
students seemed ~o feel unable to even begin learning some of the
sections required, that of probability theory in particular. I had
already undertaken studies in psy~hology as I was becoming
increasingly convinced that the psychological aspects of
mathematics instruction were central. The purpose of the study was
to develop knowledge and understanding of cognition snd
metacognition in learning and teaching in order to contribute
positively to relationships in tertiary stochastics teaching. It
is aimed at the reader ·who is interested i.nthe applicatl.ons of
tbeo:des of cognitive development and instruction to the teachinf:(
and learning of mathematics-related disciplines.
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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
"Probability is an obvious and simple subject. It is a
baffling and complex subject. It ia:a subject we know a great
deal about., and a subject, we know nothing about.
K.indergartners I. in study probabf H ty, and philosophers do
Such contradictions are the st.uffof probability. II
Kerlinger, 1964, p.94
1.1 Conceptualising of the Problem
This research has been undertaken in an attelllPtto understand
problema that became evident to me while teaching probability and
statistics courses to ~seI"Vice-course' students, students whose
choice of sub..iec"ts necessitated some knowledge of probability snd
statistics, but for whom this was not the major interest. These
students were drawn froll1the fields of, inter aHus economics,
psychology and medicine. Many of these students found the
stocha.stic courses difficult, especially the probability theory
component.
The existence of problems in the learning and teaching of
Probability Theory that contribute to the difficulty experienced by
students and teachers is well known. Dicks (1989 , p.15) makes the
cla.im that in South African universities only "a. very small
percentage of participants (rarely higher tha.n 10%) really master
the subject [and] [tJhe majority (as high as 90%) are minimally
conpetent..If The problem in teaching and Jearntng probability and
statistics is both real and acknowledged.
1.2 Method of Procedure
"To educate and teach human beinga it is necessary to know
their psychology. Conversely, a psychological knowledge of
people ••• 18 most successful in the process of education and
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instruction. The unbroken unity between psychology and the
educati-:>nalprocess is reflected especially in this point."
arushlinskii, 1987, p.TS
This research attempts to provide a theoretical explanation for the
1ifficulty service-course students experience with Probability
Theory by ex~laining the processes involved in the learning of a
scientific: subject. In addition it attempts to orient teachers to
their responsibilities arisin~ from the theo~y. In order to do
this I will consider the psychological subject (person) as primai."Y.
While my express purpoae is to addr~ss an existing problem for
learners and teachers of probability in the service-type course,
the theory has a far wider application. It has relevance for tbe
learning and teaching of Probability Theory! in general and
pertains broadly to the learning and teachin~ of mathematics-
related disciplines.
The method of procedure will be conceptual, using empirical data
draw from my teaching and research experience at the University of
the Witwatersrand as supportive or illustrative only. As this
research is not intended to be quantitative, I will use terms like
'.!liMY' and loften' as indicative of types of problems rather than
as indicators ()f their pervasiveness. Structurally, topics
introduced may be reintroduced·and further deve.loped.
1.3. Specific Problems Encountered with Students
Many types of problems exist for students in the area of
Probability Theory, some more perplexing than others. Students
often revealed that they felt that Probability Theory held no
meaning and that they felt that they were incapable of solving
problems requiring the quantification of uncertainty.
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The problem that particularly concerned me was the inability of
some students to search for that which was subjectively unknown-
especially in problem solving. Many could not even begin to
attempt to solve problems, even thou!sh they had seemingly been
provided with the necessary knowledge. They felt that they could
more ~~::;ily cope with stec~tionsof the work where there were t rules'
one could apply to so lve the problell.
"There is a tendency for atudenbs to fa,1.1into "a 'number
crunching' mode, plugging quantities into a computational
forllluia or
representation
the formulas
problems but
procedures without forming an internal
of the problem ••• They may be able to memorize
and the steps to fo,1low in familiar, well-defined
only seldom appear to get much sense of what the
rationale is or how concepts can be applied in new situations."
Garfield and Ahlgren, 1988, p.46
Struggling students often reported that they perceived Probability
Theory as a collection of facts that mURt be used to Bolve the
problems set in tutorials and examination~l. I observ~d that this
drive to use these 'facta:}could overr-Ide knowledge the students
actually bad and which they could have easily scceased before they
were exposed to new information. Instead of gaining a new Level of
perspective on everyday probability understanding, the students
were lOSing their intuitive notions and failing to employ
principles, like counting, where they may have been appropriate.
They would concentrate on the surface features of a problem and
seemed unable to discard irrelevant information in categorizing ~
problem or in translating values into a model. Either episodic or
algorithmic thinking seemed to dominate, not allowing the broad
access to cognitive stores needed for solving some proba.bility
problems. Non-algorithmic ~~proaches were beyond the reaCh of
their confidence and feelings of helplessness were pervasive.
Given that the conditions of a problem can never be exhaustively
taught, and given that thought is necess~rily independent in that
there is always some new aspect (Brushlinskii, 1987, p.78j,
teachers are failing if they do not elicit a c~eative, productive
process in the teaching and learning situation, and if they cannot
assist students to be independent in the use of the structures that
statistical theory provides.
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I noticed that students sometimes failed to understand what they
were doing from the vantage point of comparison with what others
were doing. In one tutorial group, one student had tackled a
problem from first principles, while the others had used Bayes
Theorem. Although they were in effect tdoing the same thing', the
group could not see tho similarity of the two approaches because
the one appro~ch had a name and the other did not. Somehow, the
lrule' 2nd its name confounded the students' understanding. Their
knowledge remained inert (Whitehead, 1929), knowledge that one can
express but not use. Thus on the one hand the rules hindered
students in their use of previously acquired knowledge and, on the
other hand, they relied on rules as they laGked confidence and a
way of approaching probability knowledge.
A serious problem was the failure of some students to detect
fundamental inconsistencies ir~ their work. Giv,l."nthat. probability
values range between 0 and 1, it is a matter of concern whell
tertiary students provide an &l3Wer greater than 1. Brown (1978,
p.l05) refers to these types of errors made by tertiary students as
"symbol-shock symptoms", but they can also be seen as further
evidence of "inert knowledge" (Whitehead, itJid). A student may
well know that probability values range between 0 and In but will
nevertheless return an answer greater than 1 if that is what they
calculate. Thus there is a level at which students can comprehend,
yet fail to be able to UBe~ l'elev811tknowledge. MWly of these
problems emerging from my own experience h.l t~ea\~hingprobability
were not unique to my oym, or an even oroade~ South African,
context. For example, Brown (1980) ~ referring to universities in
the United States of America, states: "College students are by no
means free of checking failure as
statis.tics will attest" (1980,
any teacher of elementary
p.475) and; "[N]ega'tive
probabilities or variances are readily accepted as solutions if the
student believes 'the formula was followed correctly!" (Brown, 1978,
p.105).
There is also evidence of a discrepancy between students'
understanding of certain everyday notions and corresponding formal
f('rlUulations in probabilistic terms. For example, a st11dent will
be able to explain that if two events are independent then the
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outcome of the one will not affect the J:.' ''lbabiUtyof the outcome
of the other. HI.')wever,when it comes to formal definitions of
independence, that if events A and B are independent,
t.henp(An B)=P(A)P(B), any Inturtdve sense of meaning disappears.
In an attempt to understand why the students are experiencing
problems of the types mentioned above, one can look ieotheir
general sense of the meaningfulness or of the aeanmgl.essnees of
the subject matter. If the latter holds, then there would be
little scope for reality testing or error detection, particularly
if students do not see the problems within the context of .a. system,
hence isolating concepts and being content to provide some
numerical answer regardless of the relationships within the syste:m
that structure Probability Theory.
Questions arising from these types of problem that I needed to
address were:
* why the students have no sense of the meaning of p~obability
theory, and
* why they feel they have no control, or
* why in fact they have no control over their ability to cope
with problem solving in probability.
1.4 The Difficult Nature of the Study of Probability
"The ~xperience of psychologists, educators, and statisticians
alike is that a. large propoz-t.Ion of students, even in college,
do not understand many 0:[ the basic statistical concepts they
have studied."
Garfield and Ahlgren, 1988, p.44
Probability in particular seens to pose the greatest diffictllities.
These difficulties are partlJI'problems with aatheeat.Ica, namely
difficulty with rational number concepts ~nd proportional
reasoning, difficulty in trllnslating verbal prob.Ieas , and in
general, the involvement of complex skills and concepts. In
addition to these, there is the problem created by the nature of
probabilistic knowledge itsdf, especi~Llly in the se{~mingly
contradictory concept of p:robability ELS "laws of chance",
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Kitchener (1983) refers to three levels of cognitive processing,
those of cognition, Ile'liacognitionand epistel4liccognition. The
first level, tha.t of cognition, involves Teading, problem solving,
computing, and so on. The second level, meta.cognition, involves
the .onitorlng, comprehension or control of one's progresS on the
cognitive level. The third level, epistemic cognition, involves an
understanding of the limits of .knowJ~dge, as well as knowledge of
the significance, usefulness and limitations of the skills
involved. In the domain of Probability Theory, this requires. an
understanding of the nature of the u~certainty of knowing, and how
Probability Theory attempts to transcend those limits. Epistemic
cogn itioD is eogn itioD about "ill-structured" problems (ibid. ,
p.222), problems which have no possibility of a single defined
answer, these latter being called puzzles. So, although the
fundamental nature of probability problems are ill-structured, the
way one has to deal with them are not. Probability Theory
represents an imposition of puzzles upon an ill-structured
situation in an attempt to "demarcate the amorphous state somewhere
between the imagined extremes of total ignorance and perfect
kno'lt!ledge"(Konold, 1988, p.,2).
Too frequently, cognition itself becomes the sole focus of the
attention of the students, which undermines the very purpose of
that focus, that of efficient cognitive functioning. I will argue
that in order to create the conditions for efficient proble.
solv~ng, the other two levels need to be included as part of a
learning-teaching orientation at a late secondary or telrtiary
level.
1.5 Specific Problems Encountered with Teachers
The problems that I have observed the stlldents experience have been
delineated.. My assumption (which will be developed below) is that
learning and teaching are inextricably linked. My research would
be incomplete if I did not also look at problems teachers
experience.
The teaching of Probability Theory is problematic. Much of .y work
8.t the wliiversity involved teaching on a team, hence I was able to
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observe other teachers at work, either directly, or by helping a
student after another member of staff h&d helped the student.
An aspect of teaching probability that came to ~f attention was
that some tutors (and here l include student tuto....s, tutors and
lecturers) were insecure in handling problems in pruoability. What
I often Observed was that when a student asked for assistance, the
tutors would assist the student using methods that th~y themselves
would have used, irrespective of what ~he students had already
attempted, often ignoring these attempts (though not necessarily
consciously)• Thus the students' .knowledge and how this related to
reaching a solution were ignored in favour of merely closing the
problem by [lrovidinga method of solving it and getting an answer.
I noticed that in assisting students with problems, teachers often
failed to go beyond the problem to other cognitive9 metacognitive
or epistemic levels. Students may be left with the correct answer
to a problem but no sense .thatthey would ever be able to do it on
their own. They may be left with no new ways to look at problems
and no way of sensing meaning of the problem or answer. Many
teachers and students seemed to become more involved with solving
Lhe problem at hand than in increasing understanding.
Teachers frequently expect stUdents to be able to identify or
extract from problems the essential principles, without direct
teaching on how to searc~ for generalizations. Some of the
teaching orientations I have observed classify as what Gt£l'perin
(1969, p.251) refers to as the ttrial and error' type. Information
may be presented systematically in lectures and textbooks but there
is no input as to how examples presented vary the inessential
aspects while maintaining the essence. The learner is left to
formulate what is t.o be attained and under what conditions. The
student may obtain the correct procedure, but it may be unstable in
the face of altered conditions and in transfer to new ta~ks.
Myers (1982) has identified three dimensions by WhICh to
Invest.Igate texts of elementary probability: external
connectedness, or the degree to which a text explicitly rel~tes the
concepts to the presumed real-world knowledge of the students;
internal connectedness, or the degree to which relations among the
concepts and f~)rmulae are explicitly developed; and explanation,
the degree to which a rationale or intuitive justification is
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provided for a particular forllul~ (p~379) • Hansen, McCann and
Myers (1985. p.3'i2) sta.te: "A1thou~~h all .our subjects were
novices, those in the explanatory text C'ondition differed froM the
others in their processing of story l?~woblems in ~'1aysthat are
similar to the "ays in which eri.p~rtsdiffer froll novices".
What I will argue is that teaching needs to become more
self-conscious in itself, that we teach the rules and the
interconnections as recommended by the ~high-explan4torY' texts of
Myers (1982) , and that we al.so teach ways of approaching new
knowledge, with consciousness' of all these aspects. Clea:tly it is
important to co~sider the interplay betwee~ formal and intuitive
approaches to tp.aching.
While teachers give considerable thought to what to teach, I
contsst that they do not give equivalent thought to how to deal
with the structures of probabilistic thinking in a way froll which
both the teachel's and the stud.ents can benefit. It may be argued
that by modelling the proba.bilistic thinking of the teachers, the
stUdents are given adequate exposure to means of approaching
problems and to the management of learning probability. But many
students do not learn from direct exposure in a 'trial and error'
orientati.on, especially if they are from -educationallY d.ifferent.or
underprepared backgrounds to the one in which they are expected to
operate, or in subject areas involving unfamiliar thinking skills.
Thus attention needs to be given to special for~s of communication
and the way that we help to structure Qur students' thinking. As
teache~s we have a responsibility to consider the orientation to a
m.ental act that we elicit in our teachiL,g. This report will argue
for a meta.cognitive approach to teaching and learning Probability
'I'beory. If teachers could understand the difficulties experienced
by the students in learning proba.bility, more specifically in
relation to the teaching thereof, it could preveat summary
dism.issal of t.he problems or the pathologizing of the students.
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2 CHAPTER TWO: SOCIO-lIISTOIUCAL NATURE OF STOCHASTIC
KNeW'LEDGE - SCIENTIFIC AND UITUITlVE CONCEPTS
2.1 The Dynamic Nature of Probability Theory
Probability and statistical knowledge is knowledge that has been
developed by communities of practitioners and academics over many
years in order to quantify uncertainty. It is systematic in nature
(albeit not n~cessarily systematic in its development). This
syateJl is historically constituted and socially tl:·a..'lsmittedand
transformed. It is a sigI.and language system that, as part of a
cUlcur8J; syste[)p has fundamentally altered p~ople's perceptions of
how to deal with uncertainty.
There are various interpretations of the very concept of
probability: the classical or theoretical, the fr~quentist or
empirical, and the subjectivist (Konold, 1988). Thus the very
conceDt of probability itself is contested. According to Konold
(1988, p.9), the terllprobability exists "in a web of discourse and
related concepts". To teach probability as a product is to limit
it to a phenomenon that is frozen in time, whereas the nature of
the .discipline is one of a developing body of knowledge, negotiated
by intersubjective agreement by bodies of statisticians who have
been given thie authority to accept or reject theory. Statistical
practice is undertaken as joint actiVity.
2.2 Probability Theory a.sScientific Knowledge
"In receiving instruction in a system of knowledge. the child
learns of things that are not before his ~yes, things that far
e,.:.:eedthe limits of his actual and even potential illli1ediate
experience."
Vygotsky, 1987, p.180
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According to Vygotsky (1987) scientific concepts are those which
are deliberately and systematicallY taught, beginning with verbal
definitions as part of a system, while spontaneous concepts are
acquired along life's way. Scientif:c concepts begin with a
generalization, while spontaneous concepts begin with the empirical
or experiential: an instantiation ra.ther than a generalization.
Scientific concepts are mediated by other concepts and people and
are not in direct relation to objects in the everyday world.
Probability Theory is seen as a scientific discipline (see for
example the South African Statistical Association Journal, March
1990, p.30), and can be classified as a scientific conceptual
system according to Vygotsky's distinction between scientific and
spontaneous or everyday concepts (or intuitive concepts using
Piaget's (1975) nomenclature).
In essence, I Wl_ ... ar.-gue that as probability is a scientific
subject, it lUust .be taught self-consciously in its
interrelationships. As a scientific system it is not
'discoverable' by the student hut must be consciously learned,
traditionally in an institutional situation. Thus by this very
consciousness and deliberateness~ it has a metacognitive aspect.
While with everydsv learning, unconscious acquisition of knowledge
is followed by gradual, increases in active conscious control,
Probability Theory bas to be transmitted as a systew of knowledge
to the novice as part of cultural transmission.
Konold (1988) argues that under-stendtng how students think about
probability before and during instruction is important. This
research attempts to explain why.
2.3 The Relationship between Present and New Knowledge
In cognitive activity, the individual actively interprets
information in the light of his or her present knowlt:!dge. Present
knowledge thus both limits and makes possible new knowledge, while
at the same time new information and processes can develop present
knowledge. If ~resent and new knowledge thus both constrain and
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enable developmentt an assumption lmaerlying educational practice
is that one's experiences in and out of an institution of learning
affect the way one makes sense of new experiences and information.
NOSIl (1988) reiterates Mellin-Olsen's claim that the "key task
confronting mathema.tics education is to (bridge the gap' betwe""~
forms of knowledge which people possess, and those which are
invariably offered at school •••" (Noss, 1988, p.404).
students do Dot begin a study of probability with no intuitive
sense of what probability means. Rather, the student has some ~
priori sense of probability which I have referred to as intuitive
concepts, whether learned spontaneously or formally some time
previously. These intuitive conceptions can be either correct or
incorrect and serve as cognitive structures into which new
information can be assimilated.
2.4 Misconceptions Regarding Probability Theory
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) have investigated incorrect
intuitive concepts, or misconceptions, in probability. These
misconceptions are frequently coherent and stable and are
meaningful to the thinkers within their current structures of
knowledge. Konold (1988, drawing from Kahneman and TverskYj 1973)
has developed a model of non-formal reasoning under uncertainty in
an attempt to explain student thinking \ even where that is in
contradiction to the forEal discipline. It is an attempt to
understand the conceptual bases on which erroneous probabilistic
interpretations are made.
A commonly held misconception is that probability values are meant
to provide evidence for the outcome of a single or 'the next'
trial. other common erroneous intuitive concepts in Probability
Theory include the 'representativeness heuristic' (degree of
similarity between sample and parent population) and the
tavailability heuristic' (relative ease of bringing to mind). For
when considering the outcome of six spins of an unbiased
if heads is designated H and tails T, the outcoae HHTHHT
looks more likely than HHHHlliI, as it appears to be more
representative, while formally they are equiprobable outcomes. It
example,
coin, and
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is not easy to convince tbe novice where the formal and info)t'JIlal
are contradictory, if working p:rimarily with the informal.
There are gaps between belief and knowledge, in knowing about
probability yet not ~believing' in it, due to misunder!;1tandi.ngits
syr.tematic meaning. Knowledge and belief can be seen aa
inseparable until one finds students who can understand the theory
of say thft tgamhler's fallacy' and yet will still insist on betting
on red i"l'l roulette if the last few spins landed on black. There is
a belief that the outcomes are not independent.
According to Mevarech (1983) these .isconceptions can be a..··ply
ingrained in the student's knowledge base and the student may
possess subjective feelings of understanding, Researchers (e.g.
Shaughnessy, 1982; Mevarech, 1983) have acknowledged that simply
more exposure to the correct rules or the laws of probability may
not be sufficient to overcome lIIisconceptions. KahnelllSlland Tversky
(in Shaughnessy, 1982, .p.788) corroborate this when they showed
that students with substantial background in p~obability ~~d
statistics shared misconceptions with the more naive.
2.5 Cor~ect Intuitive Conceptions
However, much intuitive probability knowledge acquired
spontaneously is correct. Piaget and Inhelder (1975) divided the
development of intuitive probabilistic knowledge into stages; from
the inability to understand randomness, through to understanding
the law of large numbers. Fang, Krantz and Nisbett (1986) speak of
correct a.bstract intuitive concepts as "statistical heuristics"
(Nisbett, 1983, p.225), an example of which is an intuitive version
of the law of large numbers. Fong et ale (1986) try to explain
intuitive heuristic approaches as being some universal generalized
abstract rules that correspond with statistical rules. While these
authors use the results of Kahneman and Tversky's (1972) rasearch
as an example of failure to use generalized cognitive structures,
the research rather supports the notion that students are using
these, and that they possegg and use the necessary computational
and procedural skills, but that their erroneous reasoning holds
because they assimilate new knowledge into inappropriate
structures.
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Whether the intuithe versions are correct or Incor-rect, what is
iBportant is how these affect thE: learning of probability, bhe
students' ability to solve probability problems, and their sense of
the meaning of probability and its rules. In ot.ner words, if tbe
intuitive approaches can converge with the formal they will make
sense to the students and if the learning of the formal can lead to
greater problem~solving ability and correctness in an everyday
context, then the disjunctur~ bctwaen the sci?ntific and intuitive
closes at t,. higher level of ge.neralizlAtion.
If we wish to sensiti2e our students to intuitjve heuristics so as
to provide them with the option of deter.ining their usefulness or
otbf{rwise, we have to recognize the necessity of operating at a
higher level of generality. Metacognitive awareness of the
possibilities of rejecting preconceptions must be present if
stud.ents are to gain cOlltrol of their learning of probability.
2.6 Importance of Linking IntUitive and Scientific Concepts for
Probabil ity
Many teachers agonize over whether to start with abstract or
empirical probabi.lity concepts (Steinbring and von Harten, 1982,
p.278). Garfield and Ahlgren (1988) attribute the distaste
students have toward Probability Theory to the students having been
exposed to the study in a highly abstract and forrual way. However;
while some students do net even understand the gonls of assigning
probability values, a return to the elslpiricalor the couching of
new knowledge in students' everyday knowledge (adequate or
inadequate or erroneous) would be worthless. Thus in this report I
contest the necessity {l·r ~Iorking from both the empirical and the
formal, claiming that the abstract and formal ways are important
for conscious, controlled understanding of the discipline, for
enhancing and developing correct intuitive understanding, and for
the development of the abstract concepts themselves, while the
intuitive are important for a sense of meaning. Both forllla.land
i~tuitive must be unde~stood within a knowledge of the epistemic
nature of probability knowledge, Kelly (1986) argues that when
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teaching concepts likp. (independence' and 'mutually exclusive', it
ia important to provide not only the scientific but the intuitive
as well, saying that "we seldom help student.s to bridge the ga.p
between fuzzy distinctions apparent in nature and the very rigid
distinctions made in matheaat Ics" (p.3) > My theais claims and
explains the necessity of the intuitive and scientific
co-developing, so that the scientific helps to change any incorrect
intuitive notions and the intuitive helps to provide meaning for
the scientUil.. Regarding independence, this a:rgument would claim
that there is in fact aoae objective notion of :ndt:.wendencewithin
the practice of Probability Theory which gets embodiment from
everyday notions and from theoretical formulations ~ather than
remaining in separate dfacourses , So with the gambler's fallacy,
ideally the scientific; notion of independent events will p.rotect
the gambler from wishful thinking in the game of roulette, provided
one assumes the randomness of spins. We need to link th~
empirical, the intuitive, and the formal in explanation, and in
aci.dit on show the f'Jrm~l to be linked to itself in a consistent
system.
this.
Some teachers of probability are certainly trying to do
Walton and Walton (1981), for example, link student
experimentation
COlilparison of
with
the
computer simulation and mathematical methods.
three sets of results (actual trials, computer
s.iIIlulation,and mathematical solution) "provides a surprising and
motivating reinforcement for students The elegance of the
mathematical solutions is contrasted with the awesome
number-crunching ability of the computer and the "doir.g is
believing" experience of the actual trials" (ibid., p.3). Provided
all this is seen within the context of the goals of Probability
Theory, the students may understand the conventions and in addition
understand that they are mOTe than just conventions.
2.7 A Psychological Explanation
I have mentioned the important role of the teacher, hinted at the
importance of metabognition and introduced the notion of goals.
Man1 teachers and researchers in probability and statistics or in
even in mathematics in general recognise the need to take these
areas into account; they ~ttribute student failure to solve
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problems, given the apparently necessary knowledge, to
non-cognitive and metacogniti~e factors inhibiting the use of that
knowledge (Garofalo and Lester, 1987). However, these teachers and
researchers fail to provide a comprehensive explanation of why this
should be the case. Studies regarding affect in the literature
have commonly involved the correlation of attitude and performance
but without a theoretical reason for the importance of goals and
motives and how they will link with components of problem solving,
like confidence. As Garofalo and Lester (1987. p.3) clailll,"it is
safe to say that the overwhelming majority of problea-solving
researchers have been content to restrict their investigations
exclusively to cognitive aspects of perfoX'mance." So that, "•••
despite enthusiastic development of new instructional materials,
little seems to be known about how to teach probability and
statistics effectively" (Garfield and Ahlgren, 1988, p.45). It is
~lairued that a "major reason for the limited success of remediation
is that research ••• ~a.sriotattended to under lyin.gpsychological
mechanisms" (ibid., p.55).
Narode (1987, p .15) asks: "What are the psychological processes
that will enable students to use ideas, that they in fact have but
cannot or do not use?" He claims that this is the question which
motivates the study of metacognition in mathematics and science,
but he does not answer the question in any way that elucidates the
processes involved in needing to invoke the notion of
metacognition. Again what is missing is a comprehensive
psychological explanation for why the psychological aspects of
learning must be considered as central to understanding the
tea=hing and learning of Probability Theory.
Separating student and subject matter, process and product,
learning and developl1:ent seelled to contribute to the probleBs in
learning or teaching thus delineated. I hypothesized that both
students and teachers were less secure when searching for what was
subjectively unknown for the student , and t.hat the student as a
psychological subject was being valued at less than the subject
matter. Mellin-Olsen (1987) is critical of the 'liberal theories'
of 'process' and 'child-centred' education. Yet one cannot deny
the importance of placing the learner and the process of learning
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centrally ~fben using the Theory of Activity, which Mellin-Olsen
uses explicitly. What we are aiming for is a change in the
students' thinking while still acknowkedgmg that this cannot be
without content, that "[t)he necessary content of thought is the
"analysis, synthesis and generalization of sOlielt.hing, the
conditions and requirements of a problem to be solved, etc."
(Brushlinskii, 1987, p.70). There is probabilistic knowledge to be
acquired that must serve the students in their other subjects and
in their future careers, but in order for this knowledge to be of
use to them it sbould be meaningful in a s1ilbjectiveway as well as
being formally cor-rect ,
I will provide an in-depth theoretical justification from a
psychological perspective for teaching both the student and the
subject matter. I too will use the Theory of Activity and the work
of theorists who work within its framework. I will argue that
educational activity needs +o be treated in a unified way, ,<litha
focus on teachers and students as psychological subjects. I wilJ.
argue that within educational activitys students and teachers bo1"u
need to regain a sense of control and that this can be achieved via
metacognition on two levels, that of the teachers' management of
education~l activity and that of students awareness of their own
thinking processes.
My first step in the
theoretical terms; for
research was to understand the problems in
this I returned to Vygotsky's notions of
scientific and intuitive concepts which a~e embedded in the Theory
of Activity. Vygotsky's theory provides a model which considers
both the internal mechanisms of cognition, as well as the external
mediation of an historically rooted discipline. Hence I first
explicate some pertinent aspects of the Theory of Activity and then
progress through a discussion of ~ediation, internalization and +'he
'Zone of Proximal Development', relating these to the learning and
teaching of probability. These w' a be developed so as to
incorporate the concept of metacognition into the framework of
Activity Theory, taking due account of affect which will broadly
incorporate motives and goals, confidence and control.
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3 CtlAPTER THREE: THE THEORY OF ACTIVITY
A "study of culture and cognition .uet incorporate the study of
both the syste.s of social relation9 and of internal
(cognitive) activity".
Cole, 1985, p.159
3.1 Introduction
I shall use Activity Theory both implicitly and explicitly in order
to explain th2 problems arising in the teaching and learniug of
Probability Theory. I will draw extensively from the work of
Vygotsky2. This chapter will deal explicitly with soae of the
fundamental tenets of the theory.
The Theory of Activity. is itself fraught with controversyS and to
enter into the debates surrounding central issues is clearly beyond
the scope of this research report. However the controversies do
not detract from the usefulness of the notion for my work, and
there is sufficient common ground to p~?ceed. This introduction
will serve to outline thoBe aspects of the Theory of Activity
considered important to the atudy<, Many of these will be developed
further in this research report.
3.2 Activity Theory Explaining Consciousness
The title of this research report indicates that the relationship
between culture and cognition is considered important. There are
two major inter:"l\etati.ons of the Th~ory of Activity, one broad and
one narrow in nature.
The broad conception of Activity Theory will first be invoked. It
provides an explanation of the relationship between culture ~ld
cognition by regarding mind and 3ctivity as a unity, and by
theorizing how social relations contribute to the way in which
mental activities are organi~ed. Culture is used broadly to mean
social relations. These social relations provide the external
impetus for the construction of an internal plane of consciousness.
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Vygotsky suggested the use of the concept tactivityt.as a means of
overcoming tautological explan~tions of consciousness by
consciousness, and of overcoming explanations of behaviour by
behaviour. Activity provides a different level of analysis, by
providing a material means of 'accessing' consciousness. Mental
acts are form<:!dby and reflected in activity.
Thus activity can be seen as a lllnitof analysis which bridges the
historically different approaches of sociology and psychology to
the study of cognition. In easence, Activity Theory allows us to
see the social and the hldivicl~ualas a unity and cognition as
processes within this unity.
For Vygotsky, who operated within this tradition where Bind is
inseparably linked to culture, higher Dental functions are related
to particular social
biologically driven.
fUnctions that we
Probability Theory,
origin.
knowledge, while lower mental fUnctions are
It is into the category of higlherIllental
place the kind of thinking Involved in
that is, functions which are cultural in
Consciousness is formed in successive activities but is not an
aggregate of these. Rather, it is a system in itself, with
structures which are inseparable from systems of human relations,
and which contai.n within and between them the possibility for
development. This is impori.ant for later aS~'Ulllptionsabout the
developaerrt of concepts and the nature and deveIopaerrtof cognttlve
structures.
3.3 ~Iediation
AccQ:l:dingto Vygotsky, consciousness is not determined directly by
objects and actions but by the mediation of social beings in
relation to these. The concept of mediation is central to a theory
which posits the continuity of the social and the individual. It
is primarily with respect to mediation that Vygotsky differs from
Piaget. For Piaget, direct interaction with objects, material or
mental, leads to development, while for Vygotsky, direct
interaction
pege 18
needs to be given social meaning by mediation. In an extension of
this, consciousness or higher mental functions can be medbted by
mental reflection of the objective world us.,.•I!g psychological tools
or se~aiotic systems; for example probability itself, which uses the
symbolic and linguistic aspects of the subject matter, which in
turn nre socia1ly developed in order to impose structure on
uneer-tamtv,
There are various inter.pretathms of the notion of mediation.
There is the sense of ~ediati()n providing the necessary framework
by which to interpret stimuli and act on.the environment, that is
the sense in which mediation is used by Feuerstein (1979, 1980).
Or, ill mediation, some sign or concept is given social meaning by
another who is in command of mature functioning in that area, as
would be the case with a teacher of probability creating for the
learner a new sense of sIgnif Icance regarding subject matter, over
which the learner must gain voluntary control. Conscicusness of
the importance of gaining this voluntary control and the m.eans for
doing so is to be part of the concept of metacognition which I will
develop, arguing that metacognition is consciousness of control.
The subjects of a('ltivityare neither purely passive receivers nor
creators. Knowledge is neither determined by the external world
acting on innate or learned properties of the mind, nor is it
acquired by conscious reflection only, but rai:.herby a dialectic of
the two in activity. Any external act is mediated by internal
processes, which are reflected in external activity (Leont'ev,
1979). It is in the Theory of Activity that actions and schemata
are the outer and inner perspectives of an activity (Cole, 1985,
p.159).
3.4 Activity as the Fulcrum
Activity itself can be seen as the mediator, the middle link which
mediates objective and subjective reality:
object<--->activity<--->subject
r~here both object and subject are seen historically and culturally.
Object.s are transformed into subjective form and a.ctivity is
converted into obdect ive results or products (Leont'ev, 1979,
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p.46) • "The concept of activity thus WM perceived as an
actualization iQf culture in individual behaviour, embodied ill the
symbolic function of ••• speech systems" (Kozulin, 1986, p.267). On
the other hand "[t]he concretization of activity ••• appears as a
psychological mechanism that creates new symbols and word senses
that may eventually be incorporated into the stock of cultur.e
(Kozulin, ibid.; p.269). Probability Theory in the individual is an
actualization of years of accumulated development that nevertheless
contains within it the possibility of further deyelopment.
The potential of the Theory of Activity as an analytic tool comes
about through the fundamental nature of action. People act, and in
so doing alter the objective environment and the subjective self,
while the acts themselves are constrained by internalization of the
environment. In a sense, then, activities or tasks are the focal
point or fulcrum of the dialectic between the person, in t.hef'ulI
subjective sense and the environment, in the full social sense , in
reciprocal transformation. Mental .functioning develops 8l1d
becomes manifest in the process of activity. This has a bearing
on learning in that activity-based theories of learning include a
study of "'the internal link' of the learning process, not as an
aggregate of individual mental functions, but as the [learner's]
active engagement as a subject and a personality •••"(Davydov and
Markova, 19B3~ p.54).
3.5 MotiVf3S and Goals
In the na1"X'ower sense, the term tactivity' can be understood in
terms of its $tructures, as outlined by Leont'ev (1979). Leont'ev,
whose work: on activity is regarded as seminal, claimed that bhei-e
were diff,erent levels of analysis of activity: those of motives
(will to action) in conjunction with activity, goals
("anticipatory reflection" (Lomov, 1982, p.72) ) in conjunction
with action, and operations in conjunction with constraints4•
The active subject in interacting with the environment. is not
without motives and goals, at least as subjectively experienced in
affect. -rogether these goals and motives play a dete:rminiJrlgrole
in developlllant, organizing ~::.ntal processes in activl::y, for
example,
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the level of concentration, selectivity of perception, and so on.
External conditions constrain the motives, goalsp and operations of
activity in that the objects, means and conditions are usually
given,
3.6 Implications of the Theory of Activity
I will begin with a broad outline of Bome of the important
implications of the theory.
Firstly, in that consciousness is deV'eloped in the process of human
relationships and. in the unity of subject and object, all aspecbs
of intellectual development and learning are be seen in
interrelationship.
Activity, by dealing with that which is specifically hlUlIla'll, tha.t
is, self-consciousness and intention, presupposea purposiveness and
the importance of the cultural lIleaningfulnf-..lS"of (lbjects of social
experience. In particular, there i~ cont~nuit.v between the
cognitive and the affecti"....components of a mental {,ctwhich are
regarded as ontologically inseparable. "A cog.dzeu object,
reflected in the mind, touches to some ext.""ntupon Lhe needs,
motives, and interests of the individual, f:vuKing ;n him a specific
emotional-volitional affective relation (aspiratiun~ feeling). It
is only .to that extent that qe knows himself." Brushlinskii (1987,
pp.68-69) thus argues for the organic unity between the cognitiV'e
and affective aspects of mental phenoaena and that it is this that
must define lithenew 1.nterpretation of the 'unit'••• in psychology!!
(ibid., p.69) •
3.7 Aff,ectand Meaning
Vygotsky made the relationship between cognition, affect and
'Ueaningexplicit by :referringto
"•••the existence of a dynamic system of meaning in which the
affective and the intellectual unite that every idea
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contains a transmuted affective attitude toward the bit of
reality to which it refers.1I
Vygotsky, 1986, p.lO
I will develop the idea of affect as self-knowledge through the
notion of Cmetacognitive experience'.
Some recognition of the importance of the interrelationship of
affect, belief and culture has been addressed In the literature on
mathematics education, for example Lester and Garofalo (1987).
These authors however do not adequately deal with the essenti.al
dialectical relationship involved, as they assume a static view of
socio-cultural conditions. According to their model (1987,
p.11-12), affect and belief cannot influence the socio-cultural but
can influence knowledge and control, whereas the Theory of A.ctivity
would place all these in dynalllicinterrelationship.
3~a Communication and Meaning
For learning to take place it is necessary to "create conditions
that will enable acti\>lty to acquire personal meaning'! (Davydov and
Markova, 1983, p.57). In order to generalize over uncertainty, by
imposing structure on irregularity, probability concepts have been
develQped which can be communicated via language and signs.
The notion of joint activity is important, for it i.swithin the
entire system of social interrela.tedness that activity t.akes its
meaning. "Thus it is not just objects and tasks that guide an
individual's acts. The individual tfits~ his act to the acts of
others. This raises the dynamic level of activity" (Lomov, 1982,
p.84). The learning of the concepts of probability needs to take
place in co-operative communication between student and teacher in
joint activity, whether this be direct ccmmunication with other
people or indirect communication through books, tapes, and so on.
"[J]oint (as well as individual) activity presupposes ~ianning,
which is realized in the process of communication" (Lomov, 1982,
p.84). Communication, as it.were, pervades joint activity, playing
&.Il organizing role. Thus communication organizes and reflects
org~nization in joint educational activity. It is in communication
that meaning can be negotiated using the sign conventions and
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generalizations of the system of probabilistic knowledge as tools.
3.9 Educational Activity
In many activities the object of activity is that some product, be
it material or ideal, is transformed by the execution of the
activity. Assimilation during the course of activity is a
by-product. In educational activity, however~ the explicit goal is
a change in the students themselves rather than a change in the
objects of student activity. Students of probability in service-
courses do nee~ to know the theory and be able to solve problems
independently, but the problems they are set are problems wi~h
pre-existing solutions, set and solved by many generations of
teachers and students before them. Hence in the learning and
teaching of Probability Theory, it is net the solution ot'the
problem that is so important as what the process of solving the
problem does for students' .cognitive development or how it reflects
their knowledge and abilitie~. The students thus become both the
subject and the ob.iect of probabllity activity while the subject
matter becomes both object and means for acquiring new knowledge
and methods of action. The devf!lopn'~ntof the subject is by means
of the transformation of the object, which becomes a psycbological
tool. The transformation of the object then is a secondary goal in
the educational setting. The product of probabilistic activity
becomes important wh\,re it enables educators to understand the
psycbological processes involved in the studencs ' reaching such a
product. Clearly this perspective would be diffElrent for practising
statisticians out.sf.dethe educational context.
3.10 Aim of Educational Activity
Service-course students are taught Probability Theory as an adjunct
to thei!'other courses. Hence it is not intended that they operate
as practising statisticians in the lreal worJLd', although some may
develop that interest. Goals vary from Irrtent.Ionsthat students
develop basic statistical knowledge and skills in order to be at
least partially 'literate' and 'numerate' where it concerns
research in their area of study or practice in the future work-
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place, through the fostering of the acquisition of basic
definitions and theorems, the developmentof skills and the ability
to trace relationships, to including aims of ffcilitating the
students' ability to be able to solve newproblems independently.
I contend that aims must include a consideration of the subjective
sense of lIleaning of Probability Theory for students, as well as a
consideration of their knowleclge of their ownability to acquire
probability !mowled.gE:,5. Education cannot he reduced to the
transf~rral of knowledge6 or the acquisition of skills, but must
include the deveIopaent; of the mental structures of the learner,
cognitive, metacognit:lve and epistemic, coupled with an awareness
of the importance of affect.
Whel'e learning is to be deliberate and the content of the knowledge
to be' learned contains generalizations, mental development of
proba~,ilistic thinking is no Longer a by-product of activity but
l..ts d,~ntral goal. Educational acti'dty call be seen as Ira system of
organiz!1:tion and methods for conveying to the individual socially
formedexper-Ience "(Davydov and Markova, 1983, P. 59).
"The reversa.l in tlle neLati.ve priority of ••• knowinghowand
knowing that, hinges on the ability to tram£mit culture, as a
system of rules, independently of its materid embodiment. It
requires of the novice that he first learn not by experience,
imitation and reinforcement :fromothers whohave done likewise
. • . but rtl,ther that he learn in advance the abstract principles
by which he can generate artefacts of his omil, in the light of
a critical evaluation of the efforts of his predecessor-a. This
is the difference between the passive abscrpt ion and active
acquisition of knowledge ••.• It is also, and most
fundamentally, the difference between learnJlng by exaaple and
learning by teaching."
Ingold, 1986, p.356
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3.11 Usefulness of Activity Theory for Explaining
Probability Problems
Thus if it is wished to understand the learning of probability it
is useful to invoke the level of analysis of activity which
addresses not only the practical actions of statistical behaviour
but also the meaning of the activity for the subjects. In other
words, use of the Theory of Activity will allow for a psycholog~cal
study of the learning and teaching of Probability Theory. It
denies the separability of activity, motive~ action, goal, means
and opera.tion in the context of the inseparability of subject and
object, society and the individual, and process and product.
We want individual change but that can come about only through
social relations with those who are more competent in the
discipline, and with the students' active involvement with the
subject matter. Thus to ignore a psychological approach to
teaching, concentrating -only on the subject matter, is tQ distort
educational activity. Misconceptions or a sense of meaninglessness
and helplessness will abound if students do not know the how and
why of theoretic!!.lprobability approaches. They will then rely
on algorithmic approaches and will not be able to cope with
novel? problems, as evidenced in the classroom situation.
As educationists we need to understand how the development of
concepts takes -place within educational activity in order to
facilitate it. In order to understand how to achieve this, we need
to understand the transformation of activity into its subjective
formulation in the psycholcgical subject. What becomes clear is
that it is necessary to look at the relationships that exist
between learner and teacher and to decide how these can aid our
underst~~ding of the communication process. This in turn needs to
be seen within the broader context of the relationship between the
social and the individual, which is not oppositional. If we accept
that Probability Theory is a symbolic tool that is culturally
created and culturally transmitted, we need to understand how the
learning of Probability Theory can fundamentally alter the nature
of thinking about uncertainty. The teacher and student need to
"ascertain and create condHions that will enable activity to
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acquire personal meaning, to become the source of the person's
self-develoi1ment" (Davydov and Markova, 1983, p.57).
To evaluate the effectiveness of educational activity in
qualitative terms. requires looking at not only the students'
"actions with the to-be-1earned material but also his methods of
control, evaluation, and self-regulation when dealing with the
materials" [Davydov and Mai'kova, 1983, p.52, 63) • In order to
achieve this the student needs to become the subject of his or her
own activity and assume "an active orientation to the real world
around him, toward himself and other people" (ibid., p.57). Hence,
the consideration of the notion of metacognition becomes important.
For human action to have the properties of activity, the subject
must accept the goals toward which his or her actions are directed.
Many of the goals of service-course students are pr.epared goals,
not of their own making. .It may r~quire considerable self-control
to accept them. This is again where the notion of metacognition
demands investigation, for it is important that students are able
to reaHze the limitations and constraints under which. they are
working u.sa prerequisite fOT dealing with them.
It is the task of'a psychological analysis to elucidate h<>wreality
is subjE~ctive1y reflected in the process of activity and what
underlies mental regulation of that activity (LODlOV, 198211 p.81).
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4 CHAPTER FOUR' ~EARNING AND DEVELOPMENT
4.1 The Assumed Distinction Between Learning and Development
In order to address the problem of the development of probabilistic
concepts, it is important to discuss what is meant by learning and
development and to investigate the rela.tionship between them. To
address the problems associated with the concepts of learning and
development is beyond the scope of thi~ report and my dealing with
the issue must therefore be superficial. Even within the work of a
single constructivist theorist, learning and development can be
used in different ways. My assumption is that learning is the
assimilation of new information into existing cognitive struc~ures
or the acquisition of new actions during this proceas, while
development is seen as more than learning, involving changes in
cognitive structures characterized by "qualitative changes in the
level and form of the abilities •••" (Davydov and Markova, 1983
p.59). If we make a distinction between the mastery of
knowledge, skills and specific abilities, and the "mastery of
methods and universal forms of mental activity" (Davydov and
Markova, 1983, p.58), the latter will refer to development. In
this way development is more general than learning, the former
relating to the structures themselves and the latter to ways of
organizing and utilizing those structures.
Development to Vygotsky was a dynamic process, uneven, with
reversals and progressions. It was seen as the "progressive
emergence of conscious awareness of con~epts and thought
operations" (Vygotsky, 1987, p.185), where consciousness itself is
constructed by social awareness.
4.2 Internal or External Generators of Change
In consideration of what it is that generates cognitive
development, Pi~get looks at internal generators, that is, internal
to the or~&nism, while Vygotsky looks at external generators of
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cognitive change. Craig (1985) synthesizes these approaches by
claiming that even if change is externally generated, it is the
individual who needs to reconstruct the cognitive structures and
processe~ internally. Thus cognitive devp.lopment can be both
externally and internally generated. While I acknowledge that
maturation is a necessary prerequisite for coping with an
increasing complexity of cognitioil, mathematical statistics is
clearly social in origin and hence it is the socially transmitted
aspects of d,velopment that concern us. As educationists we are
looking at exte:rnal generebors that will elicit the appropriate
internal changes in individual knowledge development.
We are thus seeking ways of eliciting internal changes by external
means. Hence learning must lead development. The internalizing of
social forms of knowledge and the mastery of specific knowledge
skills and abilities must generate qualitative internal
transformation allowing .for a broader understanding of the
cognitive, metacognitive and epistemic nature of probability.
Although Vygotsky (1987, p.206) does not cite his research sources
in this work, he makes the claim that "[r]esearch has shown that
instruction always moves ahead of development" •
4.3 Scientific and Intuitive Concepts and their Relationship
to Learning and Development
11.,- shall call a culture unselfconscious if its form-making is
learned informally, through imitation and correction. And r
shall call a culture self-conscious if its form-making is
taught acedeni.cal.Iv,according to explicit rul.es."
Alexander, in Ingold, ~- , p.317
Vygotsky's theory can be used to advocate the deveb.\)Dl~ntallead
that systematic teaching can play. Vygotsky provides the analogy
of learning a second language in order to explain how scientific
and spontaneous concepts are connected. The concepts differ both
in their developmental paths and in hew they function, yet there is
a mutual dependency. A second language by defi~ition requires the
existence of a first which was learled unselfconsciously.
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Analogously, tl1,,~ learning of scientific concepts depends on the
level of everyday concepts in that a "conceptual fabric" (1987,
p.180) is presupposed. In the same way as the learning of a new
language can enhance one's consciousness and knowledge of one's
first Ianguage , so the learning of the scientific can raise
consciousness about previously existing everyday knowledge,
providing for greater control and volunt~ry use in more generalized
ways. Thus teaching scientific concepts can prepare the way for
the developmental path of the spontaneous by providing structures
for their upwar.d development, while the spontaneous can provide
embodiment for the scientific. In a sense then consciousness moves
downward from the scientific while·meaning moves upw~rd from the
everyday.
Having already travelled the long path of development from
below to above, everyday concepts have blazed the trail for the
continued downward growth of the scientific concepts; they
have created the structures required for the emergence of the
lower or more elementary characteristics of the scientific
concept. In the same way, having covered a certain portion of
the path from above to h<:low,scientific concepts have blazed
the trail for th~ development of everyday concepts. They have
prepared the structural formations for the mastery of the
higher characteristics of the everyday concept.
Vygotsky, 1987, p.219
Many mathematics educators advocate .ovi~g from spontaneous
concepts totiards the scientific (e.g. F~nema, personal
communication, 1989), starting with probability notions the
students already have and moving toward the scientific. Referenoe
to known classes of phenomena held by the student are said to
provide the student with a sense of the meaningfulness of the new
knowledge. This creates problems if students have misconceptions,
for then the correct scientific conce~ts have to eradicate these
sponcaneous •.ly acquired concepts which are meaningful to the
students. If the scientific and everyday concepts co-develop,
motivation for restructuring can occur when cognitive conflicts
appear between presently held concepte, and scientific concepts
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being intreduced. For Vygotsky, spontaneous theught and
nen-spontaneeus thoQght would have antagonistic ana si.~lar
features. Vygotsky beljeves that deliberate instructien sheuld
introduce
initially
scientific concepts or generalizatiens that are not
connected tOo personal meaning, but which rather by their
abstract nature generate censciulJ..!'lnessef their meaning within a
system. From this co··development of beth the scientific and
everyday concepbs , ttrue' concept.s are formed by the merging of
consciousness and persenal mewiing:
Deliberate lea~ning----scientific cencepts~
,.,......,.t, ........J-trueSpontaneeus learning--everyday/intuitive conc(Jpts
cencepts
Figure 1: The Develepment of True Cencepts
Believing Vygotsky's scientific and ev("!ryday cencepts to be
mutually develeping doe3 not devalue everyday cencepts. It is net
se much a displacemen~, ner a broadening 001' enriching, but a
reconstructien. Everyday conceptis may still have a functio,l\in
everyday life but fer an academic discipline the students need tOo
develep 'true' cencepts that will be beth meaningful tOothe subject
and ever which the subject has conscious centrel.
This researnh argues that meaning and consciousness must beth be
prilla:-y ,,,,n:sideratiensfer teachers as they assist students in the
censtructien and reconstruction ef Prebability Theery.
4.4 Develepment ef Probability Knewledge
Develepment of probability knewledge then takes place thrQugh the
assimilatien of socially evelved.or histerically formed methods of
dealing with the werld ef uncerte'.inty. It is more than the simple
accumulation ef probabilistic 'facts' but rather the active
engagement of the individual in reproducing and transferming 001', in
fact, recenstructing theSI~ in tsubjective' ferm.
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11:.5 The Nature of Understanding Probability Theory
It is necessary to consider what is meant by the term
'understanding' with respect to Probability Theory, !:LS there is no
precise defi,,:,:itionof understanding nor any "specif:lcation of the
processes such '-ID understanding might affect" ((Myers, 1982,
p.379). The terl!l 'understanding' is often used intuitively and
hence I need. to elaborate on its employment in Probability 'l'heory.
Understanding in probability at lhe service-course level is
commonly assessed by two br-oad categor lea of problem: tformula'
problems and 'story' problems. The former presents certain values
and conditions and the students effectively substitute values. In
examining knowledge of Independent event.s , what follows is an
exemplar. If P(A)=O.6, P(B)=O.4 G ld A and B are independent events
then P(A n B) =? The story typeD on the other, hand requires the
student to categorize the problem appropriately first.
Clearly the ideal measure of understanding would be the ability of
the students to cOlie to correct problem solutions by the most
elegant methods. I do not want to become invvlv~d in a discussion
of assessment at this stage, but it does affect how acudenba
perceive -r,hei%'own understanding of probability and how teachers
perceive the understanding of their students. If it is assumed
that underst~nding may be partial, at what point do teachers
consider studenta' understanding to be adequate, o~ at what point
are studnnts to be satisfied with their own understanding? Must
the student. be able to organize the subject matter so that accurate
predictions or ans,wers can be made, via accurate manipulations and
transformations of the material? According to Myers (1982)
understanding should aid categorization and translation of
problems,
be able
this as
demands
but should the novice in a service-course be expected to
to present complete problem solutions? To be able to do
well as know that they are correct, It>lacescognitive
on the novice that may lead to the helplessness that I
often witnessed in studentis,
As with reading a novel, understanding needs tel be more than
unde..~standing the stllltements made by Individual sentences,
requi ring an understand!ing of the meanin;g of the text produced by
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their interrebitio:oship and significance. It is all very well to
be able to do problems involving ~andJ Or tor' in fclbetext as key
words, but if the students do not fully understand 1~henotions of
intersection and. union they will not be able to do problelBswhen
these terlns are ilillpliedby conjunction rather than (~:xplicit.The
students need to understand lIIorethan just the definitions and
theorems in isolation if they are to show understanding of the
subject: an understanding that will manifest in the ability to
transform,
degrees of
relate,
such.
extend and elaborate ~pon givens, or at least
Thus understanding must include a consideration
sense of t meaning'• Brsbop (1985) speaks of theof a subjective
personal nature oJ.the meaning of a new lIath<ematicalidea, one that
must make connections with present ~owledge.
4.6 The Development of Concepts in General
The idea of the development of concepts is important for
understanding difficulties experienced by thlestudent.sand teachers
of probability. A concept is ..ot just a "collection of associative
connections learned with the aid of memc)l'Y"(Vygotsky, 1987,
p.169); a concept is rather an act of generalization~ a
reconstruction in the individual. As generalizations, concepts are
related within a system, with higher-order concepts mediated by
lower-order concepts, which develop by neans of interconnections
and interdependencies. If a teacher attempts to teach a concept in
its final form, the word but not the concept may be learned which
then limits the ability to apply the concept. Tha group of
students desuribed in Chapter 1 who were all working with Bayes
theorem failed to see that they were utilizing the same concept as
the student working from first principl1ed,as they were blinded by
an empty label. They exemplify the fsdlure of the development of
the concept of conditional probability. Students who do not ha.vea
command of a concept feel helpless in even attempting the solution
of problems that are new to them. On the contrary, those students
who have mastered the functions by achieving consciousness of them
in their interrelationships, have Voluntary control as the "reverse
side" of the "conscio'.lsawareness" (Vygotsky, 1987, p.187), or have
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at least conscious control to a certain extent. Deve.lopaent is
then seen as the change of internal relationships. aaong' functdons,
4.7 The Development of Scientific Concepts
If scientific conce~ts themselves develop, (transmission' from
teacher to student is c.lear ly not the aechanf.sa of Iearn.ing ,
Markman (1981) cites research which indicates that the more facts
one has on a topic the more they interfere with each other, making
access to them difficult. Hence, paradoxically, it;helearner becomes
less proficient unless the facts are integrated into coherent
units, using organizational skdHa. This must be seen in a
dialecticd relationship with the freeing of cognitive capacity
allowing for inferential processing, or additional control.. It
seems that the service-course students are not perceiving the
system which constitutes probability. and I hypothesize that this
is due to a failure by the teachers to organize and mediate the
system and its relations to the students in a self-conscious
manner. The students are thus unable to use the concepts
deliberately (not being abl& to get going), unable to apprehend
inconsistencies (by isolating concepts from their relations and
thus becoming satisfied with a numerical answer albeit meaningless
in the system), and are unable to make sense of the laws.
4.8 Strengths and Weaknesses of Eve~yday and Deliberate Routes
to Learning
The weakness of everyday concepts is that they do not lend
themselves easily to abstraction and consequently freedom in theiA:'
use, while their strength lies in empirical llnderstanding. On the
other hand, the weakness of scientific concepts is that they can
appear as empty verbalisms~ as ou~ students so frequently indicate
to us. The strength of the scientific is that they can be used in
general situations. But it appears that for the stru~gHng
service-CoUrse students the strengths are absent while the
tofeaknesSe,gare evddenv, that is, the meaninglessness of the general
in terms of a paucity of interconnections with personal exper-Ience I'
facts whioh have nut heen incorporated into a system of conscious
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interrelationships, and knowledge which cannot easily be applied in
concrete situations. Vygotsky (1987, p.l91) says:
"Scientific concepts have a unique reI.ationshipto the object.
This relationship is mediated througillother concElptsor the
generaliJr.ationand lIIasteryof concepts emerges for the first
time. Awj, once a new structure of generalization or
abstraction has arisen in one sphere of thought, it can - like
any structure be transferred without training to all
remaining domains of concepts and thought. 'l'hus,conscfous
awareness ElntElrsthrough the gate opened up by the scie.ntific
concept",
4.9 The Necessity of the Co-development of Everyday and
Scientific Concepts
Conscious instruction of .concepts c~n provide the source and
impetus fo~ the development of concepta. By being introduced to
formal relationships between concepts, the student "rebhdnks
relationships between things •••[which] results in a radical
reorganization of' the thinking th6\tprovddeu for the ref'IectIca of
reality and the very processes of human a\~tivity"(Luria, 19'76,
p.4, in Craig~ 1985, p.BO).
Students do
1.3 above)
have some intuitive sense of probability (see section
and they Gan deal with soae of the scientific concepts
at a t rule' level, but the two do not merge to provide a senae of
the meaningfulness of the body of knowledge. As a conl3equencethe
students lose confidence in their ability t.ocope with the expected
standard of performance. The problems that : have listeliindicate
a continuing disjuilcture between t~e lin""<\(It development of
s~ontaneQus and scientific concepts» cOh~cibuting to the
pe?'pl::tuaUonof the weak aspects of the concepts, rather th,'ln the
development of the two in a way that allows for the inorease in
their stirengbhs , According to the Theory of Activity the two are
necessarily united in a single systelll. If these concepts are
taught with such a unity in mind, teaching can assist in raising
student thinking to continually higher levels of
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generalization.
become belief.
Understanding and knowledge in probability can
On the other hand, if the students are allowed to
retain these two types of concepts in paraHel, they will continue
to feel helpless in the light of the perceived meaninglessness and
uselessness of Probability Theory to them. I will ar~le that what
is required is a level of self-consciousnesn that has to be part of
deliberate instru~tion.
4.10 The Relationship between Teaching and Learning
This then requires an analysis of the relationship between teaching
and learning,
"The educational process has its own sequence, logic and
complex organization ••• It would be a tremendous error to
assume that there is a complete correspondence between the
external process and the internal structure of the
developmental processes that it brings to life."
Vygotsky, 1987, p.ZOS
Conventionally, teaching is the activity of the teacher and
learning the activity of the student. However, invoking the Theory
of Activity inhibits the polarisation of the teacher and learner in
educational activity. Both have to be actively engaged in the
students' mastering of the socially evolved forms of dealing with
uncertainty, that is, with self-consciousness leading to control
and a subjective sense of meaningfulness.
I have often heard teachers of statistics say that the students
just do not have what is needed to undertake tbe work. If teachers
accept VygotskY'R ~esearch evidence as indicative that learning can
lead development, attitudes to teaching must significantly alter
and we as teachers must assume responsibility for the development
of our students in order that they may undertake the work we expect
of th~m. This is becoming an urgent issue to consider in South
Africa, especially f.)r service-course atudenbs whe1"e some
statistical literacy is needed in order for them to contribute to
the community in other ways.
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4.11 Experts and Novices
The teacher is an expert and the student a novice as far as
knowledge of the body of Probability Theory is concerned.
"l!:xpei'ts,by definition, know 1II0rethan novices. They :~!l.ve
accumulated more specific facts in a given domain than novices,
who may have more vague, general, and perhaps erroneous
beliefs. What also comes with expertise, ••• is a greater
systematization of knowledge. Experts detect more patterns~
see l'il.orelations between discrete events, and know more
principles that unite diverse facts than do novices."
Markman, 1981, p.76
The novice has to concentrate on aspects tl~t the ex~~rt has
routinized, thus has greater processing constraints, and cannot
generate as many expectations as the expert. Novices, regardless
of age "exhibit similar patterns of behaviour ••• demonstrut[ing]
the crucfa.l role of experience and expertise in cognrt.Ive
monitoring" (Brown and DeLoache, 1978, in Baker and Brown, 1984,
».:lSS). As such there is what FlEt.vell(1981a, p.57) refers to as a
"phenomenologieal chasm" between the states of the minds of those
who know and those who are to become knowledgeable.
4.12 Situation Definition and the Establishment of
Intersubjectivity
According to Wertsch (1984' a situation definition is an active
creation or representatdon of the context by purticipants. The
reality of many a learning-teaching situation in Probabilit~ Theory
in this country involves a mismatch of the way teachers and
students perceive the learning context and the knowledge deriving
therefrom. An extreme example of this comes from one of the
students in the Academic Support Programme for Quantitative
Techniques (formerly, Mathemat::.csand Statistics) who refers to the
probp.bility course as "brt:.tal"(see Appendix 1). The teacher has a
sense of the syatem of Probability Theory while the students may
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only see a series of disintegrated statements¢ If development
cannot be conceptualized in quantitative terms, but involves a
shift in Understanding regarding the objects and the actions by
which one operates on those objects (Wertsch, 1984), then
cOlUlunication between teacher and student is required that will
enable an understanding of the way the novices are constructing the
activity in order to establish some grounds for negotiation toward
intersubjectivity. Wertsch defines intersubjectivity as the state
of sharing the same situation definition and knowing that you share
the same situation definition (ibid., p.12), that is an
'interpsychological situation definition'. In order for teaching
and learning to take place, intersubjectivity is needed. Wertsch
refers to the mechanism which makes negotiated intersubjectivity
possible as semiotic mediation, which relies on the use of signs
and language.
Given that different situation definitions exist for students and
tea..Joers, how then is one to accomplish such a situation
redef.ui.tion in order that the intersubjective condition of shared
situation definitions can prevail? This again becomes the
responsibiB ty of the teachers who may have to tempol.·ari1ysuspend
their own intrapsychological situation definition, and their more
sophisticated views of probability, in order to enter into a
communicative framework with the students, that is underst~nding
the way the students are conceptualizing the work at hand. A
temporary change on the part of the teacher might result in a
permanent change of situation definition for the student, resulting
in a qualitatively different ability t.ounderstand the activity.
This does not necessarily mean entering at the students' actual
level of development as a Piagetian model would suggest. Rather it
refers to an understanding of how the students perceive the
situation than to teaching at the level of their present state of
knowledge. Vygotsky a.rgues against teaching from the present state
of knowledge alone and speaks of raising the students' level of
understanding by teaching beyond their present knowledge, in fact
by inducing consciousness through scientific concepts for true
concept;ual development. Vygotsky's sense of the downward path i2'olll
the scientific with the embodiment by eVl2ryday concepts implies a
leading of stuuents from above, rather th61Jlan hierarchical ascent
frolllbeloh tn a taxonomic sense.
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From the cOllmunicative action of negotiating COlllllong:round,&"
dialectic between task and participants cOlles into being which
leads to individual cognitive and Bocial change, and to students'
knowledge of Probability Theory, as well as teachers' understanding
of the meaning of Probability Theory for the students, and the
adjustment of their teaching to this. It becomes important to
consider the process of how to transmit pr()oabilisticknowledge
from the expert teacher to the novice student that will enable the
student to develop adequate control of the knowledge so as to be
able to access it for problem Bolving.
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: INTERNALIZATION
5.1 Introduction
We need to consider bow culture affects cognition in order to
determine how social knowledge is learned, and correspondingly how
this can be best taught.
In this chapter I shall discuss the concept of internalization,
t:~~process which epitomizes t~e inseparability of culture and
c,"Igilition. Internalization wi"., be addressed in close relation to
the notion of the 'Zone of Proximal Development'.
5.2 Social Origins of Consciousness
Vygotsky's claw of cultural development' states:
"Any function in the childils cultural development appears
twice, or on two planfl')s.First it appears on the social plane,
and then on the psychological plane. First it appears between
people as an iuterpsychological ca.tegory, and then within the
child as an intrapsychological category. This is equally true
with regard to voluntary attention, logical lIlelllory,the
formation of concepts) and the development of volition. We lIay
consider thlS position as a law in the full sense of the word,
but it goes without saying that internalization transforlllsthe
process itself and changes its structures and functions.
Social relations or relations among people genetically underlie
all higher functions and their relationships."
Vygotsky, 1981, p.163
Vygotsky (in Wertsch, 1985~ p.166) argued that "[a]ny higher
fUnction necessarily goes through an external stage in its
develop~ent because it is initially a social function." (emphasis
added) •
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The development consciousness itself then starts with the
external (social) which is consbructed through self-reflection, by
way of other-reflection. However, cOD$ciousness must not be seen
as an internal reprint of relations in society, but is rather
formed in the transformation of these relations in internalization.
For Vygotsky (in Wertsch, 1979, p.2), then, social reality in the
broad sense plays a primary role in tho development and natur~ of
internal higher mental functions. The means for influencing or
being aware of ourselves were originally means of influencing or
being aware of others, or others' ceans of influencing or being
aware of us. If we substitute the 'teaching of Probability Theory'
for 'influence' and tmetacognition' for ~being aware of ourselves',
we need to understand the impact of the theoretical position of the
social origins of higher mental functions on educational practice,
and in particular, how others' means of influence become
internalized to become our own in an educational setting. We need
to recognise that self-reflection itself haB its origins in the way
one reflects on others and how one internalizes others' reflections
on oneself. We must thus make the claim that metacognition has its
origin in social relationships, and that metacognition in the
academic sense has its origins in the teacher-learner relationship.
5.3 Relationships as Central
Whereas Western psychology tended to focus on the individual,
Vygotsky contended that the study of relttionships is central, that
an understanding of the social relations as the context of
individual development is eSRential to understanding the
Indtvtdual , Hence this research report will cO~lsider social
relationships in the learning and teaching situation.
5.4 Internali~ation as the Process which Transforms the Social
to the Psychological.
Internalization is the transition from interpsychological knowledge
to in'crapsychologic.al, t truly mental' functioning, where patterns
of ac.tivity that had been conducted externally cOile to be executed
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internally. This i.sthe reason for the assertion in the title of
this report of the importance of considering culture, and its
mediation in comnunicat.ion" for cognition.
The choice of Vygotsky's theory for understanding the development
of probability concepts becomes clearer when the social or.cultural
nature of the concepts themselves is noted. Part of the socIal
pTocesses to which Vygotsky relers are representational systems of
a symbolic nature, and language. Thus iu the construction and
reconstruction of probs;,bility activity by the subject,
probabilistic consciousness is itself produced by means of cultural
mediation.
5.5 The Origins of Self-Regulation in the Deliberate Learning
Situation
The origins of self-regulation then lie in the expert-novice
interll."::tion,where ther~.is differential expertise and consequently
differential control of the lea~ning process. Initially the expert
provides the Cother-regulationV necessary for the novice student to
perform the required task. By taking over the communicative and
regulative functions of the expert, that is, all the procedures in
the C language-game , of Probability Theory (cf. Wittgenstein,
1972), the novice develops self-regulatory abilities. There is a
gradual shift of control from expert to novice. "That is, she/he
has not simply mastered the ability to carry out one side of the
cOll1lluRicative interaction by responding to the directives of
others. She/he has taken over the rules and responsibilities of
both participants The definitions of situation and the
patterns of activity which former'ly allowed the [novice] to
participe,te in the problem-solving effort on the interpsycilolf,}gical
plane now allow him/her to carry out the task on the
intrapsychological plane" (Wertsch, 1979, p.18). In order to
highlight the difficulties for the teacher in establishing coanon
ground between exper-tand novice, I shall elabora.te on the procesa
of internalization drawing from Wertsch (ibid.) who theorises that
there are four stages in the process.
5.6 The Process of Internalization
Mell~n-Olsen (1987) asserts that the basic position for mathematics
educators "is to introduce pupils to Ilathemi'lticalknowledge by
connecting it with their existing culturaUy embedded knowledge and
activities" (cited in Noss, 1988, p.404). This can be interpreted
in different ways. It can mean that teachc~'s must find mathematics
in the knowledge students already possess, or it can mean the
introduction 01 conventional mathematics without los.i.ugsight of
the current knowledge, skills and interests of the students. While
Mellin-Olsen refers to culturally embedded knowledge as practical
knowledge the students already have, I will re:hl'terpret the
statement using the broader concept of culturally embedded
knowledge as internalized ment.al acts.
The first level of transition :lrom other- to self-regulation
requires that the ~eacher provide the means by which the learner
can develop a task definition that will allow for student
participation
(1979, p.12)
in the learning situation. According to W',ertsch
"fa]n understanding of the communicative context
provides the necessary foundation for any transfer of strategic
responsibility from adult to child." Servioe-courae students, as
novices, have limited perspectives on the task, and their frequent
need for step-wise direction and explicit help is an indication t.o
teachers that an assessment of their situatJon definition is
required. It is a task of the teacher to investigate the social
and psychological realities of the students where thes,e pertain to
the lea.rning of probability, especially for students who have
adapted to an inadequately mediated mathematics, for example, those
whose school tea.chers were themselves were trying to learn as they
taught.
An importa.nt aspect of commun.i.cationat this stage is refated to
the learner's interpretation of the teacher's directives. It may be
that in familiar tasks~ the tel:cher's intention and the student's
interpretation correspond, but it is more likely that there will be
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incongruities between these in novel or complex tasks involving
Probability Theory.
The second lev(~l in the transltion froM other-regulation to
seLf-r-egul.at Ion i,g c~haractedzed by a degree of successful
narticipation by the student who accepts some of t~leproceduJi;'al
,'esponsibilities. However, the student's understs.nding of the
task situation would not be in complete agreement with that of the
teacher.s Although th~ students' understanding pf the task
situation will allow for interpsychological functioning, they do
not see all the implications in the statements made by the
teachers.
The third level is that in which the definitioI'.lof the task is
sufficiently mutual for participaMon by the student, and is
character-Ized by the fact that the atudent can function adequately
in what We~tsch (ibid.) ref~rs to as the t other-regulation , game.
Applied to students studying probability, this is the level where
the students can work independently provided they have 'recipes',
or algorithms, that is, the student generates the solution but the
steps are still provided by the teacher. They are apparently
lndependent but are still Cother-regulated'. However they are
now also taking a share of the strategic responsibility.
This is the point at which many sbudent.sL::lemto caase developing,
not moving on +.0 the fourth stage, where the student "take[s] over
complete responsibility for the probl~~-solving effort" (Wertsch,
1979, p.17), where the process shifts from the interpsychological
to the intrapsychological, and where the shift from
other-regulation to self-regulation is completed. As a consequence
of the last stage of the formation of a mental act, different
aspects of activity merge, that of the operation itself, that of
thought concerning the operative, and metacognition, tue last
incorporating consciousness and control.
It is illYcontention that one re..li')onthat the fourth stage is not
always reached by students with respect to Probability Theory is
that .students are not Eluffi.cj.eni..lyexposed to an articulation by
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the t,ftu,chersof the way that they, the teachers, approach problems
in the conscious metacognitive sen~e. Students may believe that
experts home in on the correct solution immediately, ~d while in
fact this ~ay be true in many instances for experts, it was not
always the case when the teachers were novices.
Internalization then is the ga~ning of control over the external
sign forms. It inc:Jrporate,'1the trrull,d,(.ionof regultttions,~rules
of the game' and responsibility £1".0110 the inte:zopsychologicalto
intrapsychologicd which eV'entually become the intemal property
of' the student.
5.7 Abbreviation while "Keepin!jin Mind"
Gal'perin (1969) speaks of ~abbreviati~n~ as being the automatizing
of cognitive processes. It is an importa.nt concept for this
research because it contributes to the difference in situation
definition ~etween teacher and student. The more familiar one is
with an operation, the more one knows the results in advance and
can omit conscious processes, while obtaining and using the
r~sults. Difficulti.es arise for 'the teacher and student if
abbreviation O(lCUrS in an uncontrolled way. If teachers have
learn~d proba.bility in an abbreviated form themselves or by
e~periE.\ncehave abbreviated, they may be unable or reluct.ancto
~cknowledge and explain the procedural steps involved in learning
and problem solving. They may have difficulty in recognizing what
aarect of the problem solving p:rocesaor principle is inhibiting
the students' development.
Egocentric thinking in particular can be a prablem for teachers of
math~matics and related disciplines because, in general, they have
developed far beyond the level at which they are teaching. "The
better you know something, the more risk
egocentrically in rela.tionto your knowledge.
there is of behaving
Thus the greater the
gap between teach~r &~d learner the harder teaching becomes, in
this respect at least" (Donaldson, 1.97n, p.19).
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If abbreviation occurs spontaneously without understanding of the
underlying priJ1cip_~e,then in each new situation the student has to
guess a method or solutionf or tasks have to be executed.
F,echanically. Given that the student will tend to rely on the more
etable cues, the danger arises that the verbal formula becomes
fixated prematurely, and verbal form dominates content with the
concomitant risk of .empty verbalisms. One after. hears such
utterances from students, as evidenced in the problem cited
r.egarding Baye.13Theorem, whert1 without the name attached to the
method, the students could not recognize what they were doing. On
the other hand, conscious control of the process of internalization
allows for the control of the formation or the abbreviated
reality. According to Gal'perin (1969) "only conscious mastery
of the abbreviation process can guarantee extensive transfer and
the development of new action ••• only conscioua development of
abbrevd ati.on guarantees undarstanding of the connecbdons between
operations ••• This connection not only permits the pupil to
reCOVi3r the full content -ofa men+'I\.lact when he needs to, but also
enableg the student to keep the abbreviated contents "in mind"
dUring the execution of the action" (p.~56). Hence there is a
difference between actions that operate only according to a formula
and actions that operate wiuh a formula while (keeping in mind' the
ol,'iginsand connections of '(.~Ia formula, making the operation
F4eaningf'ul. As Gal'perin (ibid.) says, even though it is not
certain what i.tmeans to keep something in mind, there is no douht
that it exists. Thus even though the stUdents do not need to
actively use any previous explanation, the fac~ that it co-exists
tin the mind' and may again be accessed, can enable them to
perceive meaning.
Thus, in the development of a mental act, from external speech of
others, Dr other-contral, through ex Jrnal speech to oneself and
thereafter internal speech, most of the intermediate operations are
lost from consciousness, but can become evident when the automatic
flow of thought stops due to processing difficulties. Inner speech
is characterized by the automatic flow of abbreviated forms and
becomes the "psychological interface between culturally fixated
.'3yrhbolicsystems ••• and the individual C Language' (Kozulin, 1986,
p.269). Inner speech incorporates both the internalization of
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external or ·80cia1forms and the linguistic form by which thoughts
are communicated outwards.
Hence in speaking of different situation definitions for teacher
and student we see how this theoretical position can elucidate the
difficulties inherdnt in the teaching-learning situation,
irrespective of different lived practices of students and
teachers. The only means we have to access the way we learn to
think probabilistically is from studying the formation of the
mental function, by studying the process genetically, not by
introspection of its final form.
5.8 The Zone of Proximal Development
Internalization is a process eMbedded within a context of joint
activity between teacher and learner. I will use Vygotsky's
concept of the tZone of Proximal Development' as the context in
which internalization occurs, a context in which the present levels
and potential future levels of student thinking interact i.nthe
development pf knowledge.
Vygotsky defines the 'Zone of Proximal Development' as "••• the
difference between the child's actual level of development and thr.=
level of performance that he achieves in collaboration with the
adult". The actual level is thus determined by independent problleill
solving, while the level of potential development is determined in
extenaion with the help of the more capable (1987, p.209).
Wertsch (198-1) arguea that this definition of the Zone of Proxfaal'
Development is problematic without clarification of what is meant
when ~te speak of the halp of the more capable. Clearly being told.
what to do is at a differ.entle~el of adult guidance than being
given hints as to how to proceed.
Vygotsky's Zone
take place in
outside source
of Proximal Development includes the changes that .
cognition
who is
in an individual whi~h are induced by an
in a particular relationship to that
individual, namely that of someone more competent in that sphere of
social kno!dedge. The teacher becolllesthe mediater and link
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between the sociocultural knowledge of Probability Theory and
individual cognitive development. By mediating this knowledge at an
appropriate level in terms of what the learner needs to know,
rather than in terms purely of what the learner already knoWSt the
Zone of Proximal Development is created. That i.s,instruction
creates the Zone of ProxiMal Development by the creation of an
interpsychological process by means of which intrapsychological
development will be generated. While the level of actu~l
development may be measured, the level of potential development
will depend on the interpsychological situation entered into; in
other words, it depends on the nature of teacher assistance.
Vygotsky (1987, p.211) Riso refers to the Zone of Proximal
Development as that "which determines the domains of transition
accessible to the [learner]•••[It] is a defining feature·of the
l('elationshipbetween instruction and development". It is the Zone
of Proximal Development that looks at the process of development in
which the teacher's orientation is to future levels of development
rather than to past or present levels. It is thus clearly in the
relationship between teacher and learner that one can
conceptualise the zone of next development9, that toward which
the learner will move in terms of competence, from observation, to
participation and independence byl the internalization of the
interactive activities, and of the interrogative and regulatory
role of the teacher as model. The teacher imposes a structure on
the world of mathematical stimuli for the learner through this
social relationship and provide~1 a focus for bhe developaent.of
meaning.
In conclusions then, the Zone of Proximal Development is determined
by both the stUdent's present state of development and the form of
instruction, that is, it entails both the stUdent and the social
relationships within in which the student learns.
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5.9 Implications of the Notion of Zone of Proximal Developgent
for the Teaching of Probability Theory
The first implication of the notion of the Zone of Proximal
Development for teaching is that one needs to 'Understandwhat the
learner is presently capable of achieving, both independently and·
with assistance. The former can be assessed using traditional
methods, but the latter is largely unaddressed in evaluation
mechanisms found in the present educational Systems, especially as
it concerns the relationship between teacher.and learner.
The second implication concerns development. Vygotsky was
particula.rly concerned with bow develoPllentcan proceed.. This is
in sharp contrast to the psychology or education that seeks to be
able to measure what alread~ris. It p'Iacesresponsibility on the
teachers to orient their work to the students' development rather
than their present state of knowledge. It speaks strongly against
academic arrogance. If one is taking responsibility for
anticipa.ting the next level uf development of the students and
organizing ways of achieving this, then as teachers we cannot take
the attitude that students must 'sink or swim'. In fact, if one
teaches to present levels of abilities, then one is not
facilitating mental development as one could by organizing learning
to create the pathway for new development. Just as the
scientific concepts must be introduced in nrder to raise the level
of generality of the intuitive wld to allow for conscious control
of the everyday Concepts, and the iIttuitive concepts need
recognition for their role in the provision of Beaning for the
scientific, ~o must teaching be arranged to develop new levels of
mental ability while not lOSing sight of what abilities the
students have currently. Vygotsky clearly asserts that learning
precedes development, and good instruction must create the Zone of
Proximal Development, albeit constrained by present knowledge.
5.10 Soolal Interaction as the Motive Force for the Development
of Conceptual Thinking
Since the development of concepts involves the co-develop.ent of
everyday notions and those socially developed and cultural-y
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transmitted concepts, the scientifi~, aediati(.ll!lwithin social
interaction is the Ilot.iveforce for the development of conceptual
thinking in probability. Social history and individual development
are Hnked through instruction. Teachers then have to consider how
to structure interpsychologicttl (motioning in tht.'context of joint
educational activity in order to facilitate intrapsycbological
functioning.
The Zone of Proximal Development can be seen as the interface
between actual development of spontaneous concepts and the
development of scientific concepts. Scientific concepta form "a
zone of proximal possibili Hes foX' the development of everyday
concepts" (Vygotsky, 1987, p.169) toward trUl~ concepts, involving
consciousness, control and meaning. SOillem!athematics educators
have addressed the significance of this relationship, for exuple,
Garfield and Ahlg""en (1988., p.54) who say: "It is lik·ely that the
real issue will be how to.optimize the interplay of experience and
rules" •
While instt.iction must take account of the present capabilities of
the learner, this does not limit the teacher to teaching frOB {the
known to the unknown'. It permits the teacher to introduce
concepts and processes beyond the level at which students are
independently operating and by the process of showing the. how to
respond to the n~w material, instruction can prepare the way for
the development of new concepts and processes. In this way
students are constructing knowledge and developi.ng competence in
the relationship with the more competent. Effective instruction
must anticipate developlIlent.
It becomes apparent that Bcientific concepts lead to the
development of control by consciousness, at a higher level of
mental functioning than the concepts which submit to that control.
It is to this higher level of functioning tha\t I apply the term
'.etacognition'.
SOllie mathel!$atics educaUon researchers have used a Vygotskian
approach. Manning (1984), for example, speaks of the i.poX'tance of
inner speech, drawing on the process of deve lopaent of higher
mental functions via internalization of dialogue. Manning believes
that teaching children to speak to theMselves will enhance
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cognitive growth. llaplici tly she aaYllthat children will cometo
internalize' outer controls. Explicitly, however, she focuses on
teaching the students to 8.rticulate t inner speecht • I argue that
we should be lGIQidngat an articulation of the outer controls, in
order to enable studants and teachers to develop intersubjectivitYt
for it is communication that is the point of contRct between the
teacher. and the student, and between actual and pote~tial levels of
development.
Acknowledging the pr~\Valenceof liisconc'\!JtioIlls leads us to conclude
how articulations of processes in cODunicat;,ionand ,joint activity
become important. the teacher ".'~ Learner move to a greater
understanding of probability and 'the process of teaching and
learning probability respectively, by lIerutksof evaluating their
current beliefs against their ownother b~;~liefs, other peoples'
beliefs (including the experts), and empirica.1 observations.
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6 CHAPTER SIX: METACOGNITION
II [T]he ability to monitor one's comprehension is necessary
foi' academic excellence ••• Without such knowledge aleut
comprehension, comprehension itself will suffer"."
Markman, 1981, p.8l (emphasis ~ine)
"Perhaps the most telling feat.ure of cl IndcaI interviews
analyzed from the perspective of aetacogni tive pJ!'ocessesis the
absence of those processes in failed problem solutions."
Narode, 1987, p.2110
"Anyone who has ever taught a group of college students must
know that their Iletacognitive skills in a variety of domains
could stand considerable enhancing!"
Baker and ~rown, 1984, p.380
6.1 Introduction
Metacognition is the rubric under which .any questions related to
thinking are discussed, in particular questions concerning whether
one nan help others to improve their thinking skills by encouraging
refle(ltion upon those skills in relation to cognitive goals. As
educationists, our frequently expressed goal is to teach so that
our students become independent thinkers and capable
problem-solvers. How then does metacognition assist in the
realization of this goal?
6.2. The Notion of Central Processors
Before embarking on any discussion of metacognition I must address
the notion of generalized cogni~ive functions. Walkerdine (1988),
drawing from Foucault, speaks in terms of sepaTate discourses j~ •
learning. She argues:
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"that .athematic3 (and cognition more generally) is produced in
practices [which] argues against a model of a single
pathway of cognitive development, a central information
processor, and for the possibility of specific 'skills' being
learnt, produced and accomplished within the practices
themselves".
Walkerdine, 1990, p.248
This position challenges the notion of central executives or
p~ocessors, Rlthough Wa~kerdine does address the question of
transfer in terms of overlapping relations of signification (1988),
allowing for the generalizations of some skills. Working with the
development of probabilistic skills within the activity of learning
Probability Theory, I assume that there is some central knowledge
base that consists of skills and processes that are transferable
across 'disco11rues', and I place metacognition into this category.
Thus, while I accept that Probability Theory is historically
developed as a 'discourse' different from, say, mathematics, r
nevertheless assume that there are trans-historical structures
within the broader academic domain. I am not assuming that these
structures pre-exist learning within the field but rather' tbat
aspects of thought learned in one field may be usefully used in
other fields and as such can become 'central'.
Given the difficulties that arise for students in making
connections between alternative formulations of concepts within
Probability Theory, for example the concept of independence to
which I have been referring, one could argue that transfer of
learning does Dot take place and that the formal and the intu.itive
remain separate discourses. HoweveT: I have chosen to read these
rather in terms of the disjuncture between scientific and everyday
knowledge (Vygotsky, 1987), mid will argue that metacognitive
awareness of this disjuncture can assist in closing the 'discourse
gap' by development to qualitatively higher cognitive levels,
toward 'true concepts'
In addition, I assume some intrinsic and conat.ruct.Ive level of
mental operation, since if learning is purely ex:perientially-based,
novel (even in the sense of 'new to the student') solutions to
problems would not be possible.
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6.3 Bi-level Psychological Organization
Pascual-Leone $
in Jukes ,
by his Theory of Constructive Operators (1979, and
1987), hypothesizes a bi-level psychological
organisation, with learned and intl'in£ic operators. Pascual-Leone
argues for intrinsic operators at the meta-level acting on learned
content. Activity Theory argues fol' the necessity of the
interrelatedness of constructs and oI,:..6i'.rations,hence I assume a
dialectical relationship betweeh the learned and intrinsic at both
the cognitive and metacognitive levels, in keeping with
constructivist notions. Thus there are aspects of metaconstructs
that are learned which operate to organize cognitive structures and
to enable the subject to move beyond existing social knowledge.
Placing these notions within the Theory of Actidty would b~ly a
dial~ctical relationship betweeh the aechanisms of learning by
internalization and intrinsic generative aechanisms, thus combining
the learning of social (extrinsic) forms of knowledge with
creativity. We thus have levels of mental operation which are not
situation-specific and which ar'J versatile with creative
possibilities.
In summary, I am assuming that the:re are different levels of
cognitive structures with both cognitive skills learned within
activities and centralized skillsf these latter being learned and
intrinsic. ~hese centralized skills are potentially trar.sferable
across discourses and operate on other levels of skills. Such a
process-structur.al model is necessary to explain the choices made
by the subject between the various possibilities that would accord
with the subject's intentions and goal orientation. It enables us
to move closer towards explaining the unique w~ya in which
connections between mental structures must be made for cognitive
development to occur.
6.4 .Affect
According to Pascual-Leone (1979) the 'activation weight' of
schemes can be boosted, energizing the meta-level schemes that are
contextually free. Affect ~d belief can be seen as part of the
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superordinate structures which form the control executives. It
could be argued that affect and belief may p.xist at the cognitive
level~ and that the levels of thought are not distinct. However,
one cannot ignore the importance of affect and belief when looking
at cognitive development, and it is this aspect of metacognit:i.on
upon which I shall focus, in particular, those of consciousness and
control as pertaining to confidence in the learning and teaching of
probability. Hence 1 turn to a discussion of lBetacognition and
draw from the discussion aspects 01' lIetacognition that are
essential for independent problem solving in probability, in
particular, a belief on the part of the students that they can
manage probability at the level expected in a service course, and a
commitment from the teachers that they can help the students.
6.5 Historical View of Metaco~lition
Metacognition is a term often used without adequate delimitation
(Flavell, 1981a) and "has been used to refer to a variety of
epistemic processes" (Flavell., 19,H'~~hp.37). Flavell (ibiq., p.37)
defines metacognition broadly as "knowledge or cognition that takes
as its object or regulates any aspect of any cognitive endeavour",
in other words "co~ition about cognition".
It encompasses
"knowledge concerning one's own cognitive processes and
products or anything related to them ••• Me\'acognition refers,
among ,other things, to the active 1I0nitoring and consequent
regulation and orchestration of these processes in relation to
the cognitive objects on which they bear, usually in the
service of some concrete goal or objective."
Flavell, 1976, p.232
Brown's (1980) understanding, too, is that "[Il]etacognition refers
to the deliberate conscious conbrof of one's own cognitive actions
"(p.453). According to these theorists, metacognition
includes the three aspects of knowledge about cognition, monitoring
of cogni tive processes and regulation of these pJrot::esses,by which
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I understand them to .eaIt self-regulation. However, within the
theoretical position I have assumed this self-regulation must
initially have aspects of other-regulation. I will argue that
within the Zone of Proximal Development other-regulation of
cognition is internalized to become self-regulation via
self-reflection. Even though there may be interaction with
intrinsic levels of control, whet concerns us as teachers is that
which can be socially developed.
The co.rcept 'metacognition ' thus can unf te aspectc of the
historical1.,ydifferent notions of 'consciousness' (in the sense of
'thinki:<lgabout thinking')l1 and 'executive control', deriving
theoretically from developmental psychology and information
processing, respectively. It is embedded within a framework that
is oriented to processual, goal oriented and task related activity.
6.6 Metacognitive Experience
Flavell (1981b, p.273) defines metacognitive experiences as
conscious "cognitive and/or affective experiences or states of
awareness that accompany or relate to a cognitive
enterprise". Metacognitive experience then is the
'consciousness' rather than the 'executive control' aspect of
cognition. This conscious awareness iq usually triggered by
feelings. Affect thus can facilitate the development of
metacognitive
guiding of
knowledge and contribute to the monitoring and
cognitive actions by boosting or activating the
metacognitive superscheme. Metacognitive experiences can be
feelings or thoughts of und~rstanding or not understanding, .ike
.surprise when expectations are not fulfilled, bringing to
consciousness the failure of the cognitive operation. Automatized
processes, too, can involve metacognitive experience by the
'feeling' of the process moving in the right direction (Gal'perin,
1969, p.264), thus providing a control. Metacognitive experience
unites the affective and intellectual, which is fundamental to a
theory of Activity with meani.ng as a unit of Malyaia (d.
VygotBky~ 1986, p.10). If students' perceived sense of conbeo.l and
actual control over their learning of probability is in questionll
the relationship between affect and cognition needs to be
investigated further. While raetacognitioncontains the notion of
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control, control can be facilitated by lIletacognition, in a
dialectical way.
6.7 Elaboration of the Relationship between Affect and Cognition
and its Link with Metacognition
The worK of Skemp (1976) is useful for developing the relationship
between 8~fect and intellect in metacognitive experience. Skemp
speaks of a director system which operates on the environment using
sensol's to gain information from the environment. A comparator
compares the 'l,....-esent state with the goal state. He speaks of
pleasure reing experie~ced as one moves towards the goal state and
unpleasure as one moves away from the goal state; of fear a.~ one
::oves tOWB.7'i what he refers to as an anti-goal state and reHef as
one moves away from this anti-goal state. Second-levd d1rector
security and
goal~directed
ability to
anxiety
actions
this first-level director system, at a
He speaks of confidence, frustration,
in terror' of one's abiH ty to perform the
systems operata on
metacognitive level
(p.1S). Confidence is experienced in Ute
move towarns the goal state, in the
in~bi1ity to move toward the goal state, security in ~he ~,bilitit to
move away from the anti-goal state and a.mdety in the ina.bility to
move away from the anti-goal state. Thus there a~e the levels of
the change of state and the knoliled~e of tileabilit:r to change
state, with the emotions as sign1,)osta. In the teaching and
learning situation thp.re are at least fo~r director systems, two
fer tnE.!student and two for the teacher.
Skemp (ibid.) claims that e conscdousneas.' is the central issue of
psychology with increased consciousness contributing ~~,;..the
increased adaptal'U:ity of a director system (p.15). The delibera.te
heightening of conl3ciousness will bring about improved functioning
in llew situations, as learning is seen as a change of sba+e of the
director system towarrl mC)re accurate, re.l Iebl.e, etficient~
extensive and ccnp Iebe functioning. Too much anxiety or
frustration can lead to withdrawal of consciousnass from the source
of the emotions, and repeated failures will der.:t:t"oy~onfidence. My
argument thus strelsses the im}..lortanceof students) feelings of
confidence regarding, their periormRnce.
Metacognition can lead to four types ol situations regarding
knowledge: knowing that you know, knowing that you do not know,
not knowing tnat you know, and not knowing that you do not know.
Clearly, the first is the most desirable state for academic
competence; the second points to the necessity of cognitive action;
the third may lead to lack of lack of confidence or inefficient
working; while the fourth is a. breakdown en both the cogrri tive and
metacognitive
referred to
levels. Subjective feelings of understanding
as "misconceptions" are failure on the cognitive and
metacognitive level. This research investigates the mutacognitive
experience of l!ilure to comprehend or use knowledge.
Relating back to the types of problems I delineated in the first
chapter, it is apparent that failing to be critical of a
probability value greater than 1 is failure at a metacognitive
level as well as at a cogniti~e level. However, in my experience
few students of p;robability fall into the category of not knowing
that they do not know. Rather they struggle to understand l!bx
they do not know, and consequently feel helpless in remedying the
situation. Some of my students have reported a pervasive feeling
of helplessness regardtng probability problems, reporting feeling
~~t they have no control over the resolution of problems. These
s,tud1ents have no means of delimiting the problem areas. Instead of
having clearly delineated and articulated problems, they have a
sense of inteller.tual blur. They do not see themselves as capable
of (!malysing what knowledge they have and where they are ignorant.
It :!Ls probable that only the students who are already capable are
able to ask questi~ns as they monitor their progress and engage in
strat:egic action.
6.8 Confidence and Metacognition
Clealriy the above analysis speaks fOl' the importance of providing
some way for t'~estudents to sense and have some control ever their
Learnmg , esp ~i.~J.ly as affect, and I argue that confidence in
pa.rticular~ (.II activate cer-cadn oognf tive functions (of •
Pacual-Leone, 1979). For t:!xrunple,Cavanaugh and PerlllutteJ;'(1982,
p.19) cite high correlations between students' verbally expressed
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feelings of knowing' ald short response latencies on memory tasks,
the latter said to bs indicative of confidence. The danger for
student~ of a lack of confidence is that they may not only give up
trying to do probability problelBs but lIaygive up trying to learn
how to do theil,too.
Insecurity in the learning situation can be compensated for by
external sources of confidence, including training of skills and
control of those skills by heightening consciousness of the nature
of the task and of the support; hence metacognition with. mediation
in the Zone of Proximal Developlilent.It is in activity and through
relations with others, in particular with mediators, that the
subject cOlliesto know himself or herself and thus beco.es the
object of self-knowledge (Brushlinskii, 1987, p.T6). We have seen
th!:£t internal control develops from the internalization of external
control within the Zone of Proximal Development. Consciousness and
control are different aspects of a unified Vygotskian concept of
consciousness which is broader than aetacognition as defined by
Flavell. However, both contain the notion that awareness and
control are in the service of goals. With acgte consciousness (on
a theoretical level) of the role of affect, motives and goals in
the development of consciousness and control, I state that
confidence can be seen as the metacognitive experience of internal
control.
6, 'l The Necessity of Metacognition in Deliberate Learning
Situations
Brown (197B~ justifies the use of the tel'S twetacognition' in the
face of criticism of a proliferation of 'metas ~, by clailning that
the tmeta'-level reflects an important change of e.phasls,
provfdi.ng an important focus for a discussion of effective
thinking. She acknowledges that conscious control of thinking is
not necessary for all forms of knowing, but that it is necessary in
deliberate learning and problem-solving situations. Thus for
everyday interaction with meaningful environments, Broun would
concede incidental learning, but in the scientific context in which
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prob2bility has been classified, she would support the claim that
consciousness is essential, "the underlying force that the observed
routines reflect, are symptoma.tic of, and are epiphenomene.l to"
(Brown, 1918, p.79). Thus she claims that skills training alone is
inadequa.te. One needs an orientation toward self-awareness and
self-regulation, including awareness of the epistemic nature of the
task in order to gradually increase conscious control over that
knowledge. "Students who receive only instruction in the skills
[cognitiv~] often fail to use them intelligently and on their own
volition because they do not appreciate the reasons why such
activities a~e useful, nor do they grasp where and when to use
thelll'(Baker and Brown, 1984, pea81).
Metacognitive experience and goals o~ motives interrelate to the
extent that "intention in action ••• corresponds to our experience
of doing" (Ingold, 1986, pp.318-319). Thus, according to Ingold,
the 'subjective meaning' of action lie~ in intentionality.
This strengthens the argument for the illlPQL...;iUlceof metacognition,
for what we are aiming for is the embodiment of scientific concepts
f1;'om everyday concepts and the structural readiness for the
learning of scientific concepts based on the development of
everyday concepts. In effect, a shift away from a purely cognitive
orientation, to one which includes a metacognitive and epistemic
orientation, allows for both 'lateral' and 'vertical' transfer, for
the ability to integrate subskills with self-regulation. This
resulta in an extension of the possibilities for broad synthesis
and application of knowledge,
Baker and Brown (1984) cite research sUpporting positive effects on
studying from this change of emphasis, claiming that it is not
surprising that instructional programmes that specificall~ train
for vertical and lateral transfer by attending to the students'
awareness of the skill's utility and their ability to regulate
their own activities a~e more successful than programmes that leave
the problem of transfer entirely up to the learner. Hence the
notion of the mediation of transfer of general skills at the
cognitive, metacognitive and epistemic level moves into the
foreground in the Zone of Proximal Development.
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S.10 Metacognition and the Learning and Teaching of Probability
Theory in Particular
Schoenfeld (1984) states that metacognition is an essential
component of competent mathematical performance. He claimg that
students do not develop many metacogniiive skills because
mathematics instruction concentrates on the computational and
procedural.
It may be argued that in probability classes students are getting
feedback on the problems they attempt ruld that there is tutorial
help, thus there would surely be metacognitive experience leading
to the development of metacogni tive knowledge. But conse ious
responses consequent upon cognitive failure, acco~ding to Flavell
(1981a), are not necessary, and the capacity to notnce and
interpret difficulties with comprehension varies with age and,
analogously J expertise as "[m] etacogniti ve def Icdencfes are the
problem of the novice, .regardless of age" (Brown, 19SO, p.475).
Thus it cannot be assumed that metacognition will develop
spontaneoual.y, One cannot present probabilistic information to the
students expecting them to cope with it in the same way that they
would eve-ryoQY learning.
There is evidence that .41etacognitive knowledge does develop
indirectly with 8(.21001 experience as a "by-product of active
attempts to understand" (Markman, 1981, p. 75). However, Brown
(1978) points out that students' inco~petence at assessing their
own abilities indicates that this method of developing
metacognitive knowledge is not efficient, a situation which would
be exacerbated by the schooling litany of our students have had.
Flavell (1981b) claims that metacognitive experiences ar\L.most
likely to occur in situations l~here there if; intentiona.l and
conscious thinking or when expectations are not confirmed.
Teachers need to concentrate on facilitating its development.
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6.11 Self' Regulation in Institutional Settings
Iu situations where learning takfJS plE;.ce in Iarge , often
i.personal, i.nstitutions, as is tra,Utionally the case in service
course yrobability tesohing, the dyadic notion underlying the Zone
of Proximal Development becomes .ore of an ideal than a
possibili ty. On the whole, the student is a.lone in his 01' her
learning and hence self-regulation becomes vj:i;al. Thus it is
imperati ve that \.he student hasten to assume the role of tutor as
well as tutee - and hence the importance of teaching meh.cognitive
skills, allowing for t.he internalization of the role of the teacher
by the student. The students, although novices in pr,oba.bilitYf
nevertheless have some sense that the responsibility for learning
is larg(;'ly their own but that they need the support of the m01,"e
knowledgeable. This implies that the teacher needs to be' sensitive
to the lstudents' needs and level of participation and hence
coaaunfcatdon between teacher and student needs to be open and
clear, with teschere I responses being contingent: upon the atudenta i
level of ca.pl':bility. Again ti\r,is implies mutual responsibility.
We may conclude that there is a double need for a metacognitive
odenta.tion in the teaching and learning of probability, for not
only is it the case that metacognitjon may not have developed
adequately spontaneously, but it also has to become a conscious
consideration for the teaching and learning of probability in
particular, a scientific subject in an institutional setting.
6.12 Levels of Metacognition for Teacher and Learner
Referring to Figure 2, there are metacognitive aspect.s f(,.r both the
teacher and the learner. The teacher metaco~li$es at two levels,
at the level of thinking about his or her own thinking and at the
level of thinking about the students' thin.king. In addition, the
beaoher has to assist the students in thinking about their own
thinking dur-Ing the process of coming to terms with knos.ledge of'
probability. This is tbe indirectness delineated by SkE!mp(1976),
where the teacher has only indirect access to the students'
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cognitive processes, ~d that is via metacognitive precesses.
wn thinking
teacher--refJects on
I
students' thinking
.--organization of teaching-learning process
intersubjectivity
via communication
wn thinking
learner---reflects on subject matter
,teacher's thinking
Figure 2: Metacognition in Learning and Teachi~
It is the regulatory funoUon of teaching, the teachers'
responsibility for and awareness of an Qrganizing role, which is
realized in communications that constitutes part of their
metacogniti'lre role. What the student needs to reconstruct is the
interrogative mode of the teacher. so that the conscIousness and
control of the teaching process becomes the consc:iousne~s and
control of the learning process.
This is not an easy task, for the connections between external
social interaction and intrapsychological processes involved in
self-regulation become more distant the more expert one becomes in
a particular task (Wertsch, 1979). Teachers' abbreviation of the
language and skills of probability make access to the knowledge of
the development of their own intrapsychological functioning'
difficult. A teacher may be glib in an explanation because he or
she so clearly understands it. Mathematicians are famous for
coaaenta like "It is intuitively obvious that •••". Flavell
(1981a, p.44) states that [tlhe egocentrism-based feeling that, if
it feels this clear to me, it must be clear to others probably
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cannot be extinguisbed, but it should not be allowed to engender
egocentric judgellentf; and autions". This ''3 ilDportant, eS'P~cial.1y
at· present in Sout.h Africa. Responsible teadle.t"ssimply do nof
have the option of being arrogant~ claiming that as they managed to
get where they did, others must sink or sniIJ.. Good teaching
requires an understanding of learning and of what leads to
competence for both the teachers and thei~ students.
Wertsch (1979) argues that the mechanisms by which one moves fro.
other-regulation to self-regulation lie in the aechendaas of
communication. The novice first has to perform the task with
other-regulation and from th~re attempt to establish consonance
between their own action in the task and the task definition and
demands. For the teacher this reql,'~resbeing aware that their own
definition of the situation cannot be assumed to correspond with
tlt.at of the learners, but that in the joint performance of the
task, understanding on the part of the teacher and learner of the
requirsments of the situation will start to converge, and that the
student will internalise the task re~uirellents.
Thus, for the learning &nd teaching of Probability Theory, two
levels. of !Iletacognitive analysis are required:
both teacher &ld student; and communication
playing an organising -role for teachers.
metacognitive educators, where the pl&llling
communication of the tasks. Metacognition for teachers includes
organizing educational activity to facilitate the controlled
learning of concepts. "By planning for instruction .£
fundamental conc.:eptswe can insure that the student's understanding
is built up systematically. This provides a firmer foundation upon
which the stUdent can acquire a grasp of Probability Theory"
(Kelly, 1986, p.S).
self-awareness in
and awareness as
There need to be
is realized in t.he
Finally, metacognitive
empirical, theoretical,
probability can assist
awareness of the relationships between the
subjective and intersubjective concepts of
students to challenge their sense of the
meaninglessness of the tasks. Thus by increasingly being made, or
becoaing, aware of their -thinking in Probabi.lity Theor;y, students
will develop their understanding of the essential scientific
intenUons of Probabili ty Tbp.ory as a tool for d~.2ling with
uncerta.inty, and thus develop an understGnding of the epistemic
nature of probability.
6.13 Confidence, Consciousness and Control
Confidence is knowledge of thl~ ability to be aware of and have
cont:rol over cognition. By means of metacognition, and ita
unifying effect on epi.stemic, met&cognitive and cognitive
experience, knowledge and strategy, we can begin to close the
diSljuncture
prob.bility,
between the scientific and everyday notions cf
and in so d.oing begin to push out that sense of
meaningless so ~tten spoken about by the students. Communication
between learner and teacher, which results in contingent control of
the learning pr0cess geared to students' needs and definition of
the situation, can allow for the development of a sense of
confidence in the students which is dialectically related to the
metacognitive experience of being able to "do probability'.
6.14 Teaching Metacognition
How then does one 'teach' Iletacognition? As with critiques and
consciousness-raising in g~M~ral, deve.Iopfng awareness of
introspection and attention to metacognitive experiences is the
starting point. These can then be interpreted in terms of meaning,
both in the subjective and epistemic sense, and implication.
Various researchers have publisheu articles on the t~aching of
metacQgnition relevant to Probability Theory, for example, Callahan
(1987). However it is not my intention to go into detail. Rather
my aim has been to explain the importance of a metacognitive
orientation in the learnj:qg and teaching of Probability Theory,
which would aim at assisting those students who have not
spontaneously developed metacogniti.ve strategies.
Direct questions regarding understanding need not be a.sked in order
for metacognitive experiences to occur as (to use Skemp's model)
thL thinking process entails affective states which provide
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inforaation regnrding cognitive activity. M~~acognitive eXperience
that is attended to may assist the individual to make decisions
regarding either the ~aking or monitoring of cognitive progre~s and
can generate further metacognitive experiencese But "[w]hat the
learner makes ui a feeling of ecnfus.ionand what he or she decides
to do about it arQ.,guided to varying degrees by bhe metaco~itive
knowledge base" (Garnert 1987, p.19). Here the teacher has the
role of extending the ~etacognitive knowledge base.
Schoenfeld (1985, in Kameenui and Griffin, 1989) suggests that
"models of control decisions" {p.580} witt a blow-ny-blow account
of metacognitive processes, explicit and articulated, will help
students. This is in keeping with the theoretical model of
internalizat~on. Students can be encouraged to be
self-questioning, adop tng "the self-interrogation mode of the
expert" (B~own and DeLoache, in Markman, 1981, p.75). Following
Vygotsky, we posit that .learning is first social avd it is the
teacher who first asks. the questions; but the students have to
learn to be both the questioner and the questioned, questioning
assumptions, locating important laws and generating questions about
them, probing weak areas, finding applicable areas and
counter-examples and so on. Students need to understand that it is
~ot from a one-sided responding to directives (as so many of our
students desire) that they will succeed, but l'&ther from the
internalisation of both roles in the learning and teaching of
probability, that iss the role of the student and that of the
OIth~I'~~~egulationof teacher, in terms of both rules and
Initially, the teachers ~ust take control; but
to be shifted to the student as and when the
responsibilities.
this control needs
teachers perceive the students to be able to assume such control.
Wood (1986) argues that the mark of a good teacher is that of
contingent control - of knowing when to
relinquish control. Wertsch and Stone
Vygotskian approach structural properties
assume and when to
(1985) argue that in a
of interpsychological
functioning, such as its dialogical, question-answer organization .
are part of the resulting internal, intrapsychological plane of
functioning via the mastery of external sign forms. Both students
::md teachers need to become aware of the social origins of
internalized mathematical knowledge.
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Lester and Garofalo (1987) outline the metacognitive role of the
teacher as· external .onitor, facilitatoit'and model. I believe all
these are well explained by the theory. "[AlII forms of external
negotiation ••• all external prods to reflection have the effect of
stilllu!ating internal negotiation, reflection, metacognition"
(Bruner, 1965, in Chipman ~t aI, p.605).
6.15 Metacognitiol1 in the :ClassroolD
Even though I have limited my research to a theoretical
understanding of a teaching and le~rning problea, some practical
applications entailed in the theory C~D be suggested. There are
methods that university students can be encouraged to adopt to help
them prevent themselves making some of the mistakes I have
outlined. For example, consciously predicting a probability may be
a worthwhile start so that the student can place the probler>linto a
'common aense' or everyday framework, which may &llow for greater
accessibility of knowledge ~tores. In any event, to do so will
po~ition the problem ~pistemically. Predictions that are wrong can
oe used to provide information about one's comprehension. When
expectations are repeatedly confirmed, one can be more confident of
one's understanding. Checking for internal c \1:sistency o~ answers
will eliminate the type of problem where negative or probability
v·.aluesgreater than 1 occur.
This may be all very well for the student who reaches scue answer,
bnt what can be done for the student who after realizing an
incorrect probability cannot ar1'ive at a correct value, or for the
student who cannot get going at all? HOiY' can we hypothesize that
metacoghition will help? Students can be encouraged to make
judgements about appropriate methods and to tentatively hold
inferences while assessing their appropriatene~js fo~ the problems
at hand. Markman (1981) claims that the more deeply one attempts
to understandJ the more comprehension problems will be ~evealed and .
cognitive strategies can be developed.
Although it could be expected that years of scnooling would result
illl abilities especially suited to acadeaic learning, abilities that
are broadly applicable, we are nevertheless faced again with the
notion of disjuncture. From my experience in trying to understand
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the aethods of education 'Hith which .any students a!'e fuiliar, I
concluded that facts are taught~ but a.renot adequately taught in
their connectedness with others, nor in some sort of pivotal
relationship around an action or goal that will allow the students
to organise them. The more abstract the concept, the lesa it w111
have everyday meaning and thus will derive .eaning only in its
interrelationship with other concepts in a systeD and in relation
to goals. The students need to understand what principles
organise the material. It may be argued that Probability Theory is
presented systematically and this I cannot contest, but within this
ordered representation, its fUndamental coherence ana its epistemic
foundation somehow fails to be conveyed. It is here that the
necessity of mediation, that of the teachel' providing selective
mechanisms for the students to use in asking gense of the theory,
of providing fL'ameworks from which they can structure their
learning and develop cognitive structures appropriate to the theory
of probability, is invoked. If the students had 'meta' knowledge
of their knowledge stores and some idea of which were potentially
utilisable in the solution of a problem, it might save them from
fixating on a knowledge area, should that area fail to provide 'the
solution' •
In the example I gave in the first chapter regarding Bayes theorem,
those students
arguing who was
knowledge that
,same thing'.
connections that
who were in fact. 'doing' the "saae thing' but were
right, could h3.ye been helped by the 'meta'
seemingly different knowledge areas may say the
"[I]t is the richness and structure of these
would seem to ••• spell the difference between
inert and usable knowledge. Ii (Bereiter and Scardamalia, 1985, p.
71) •
Algorithmic learning can be useful to a point, but given a problem
solving area like Probability Theory, what is needed is a
"concurrent understanding of the reason why the skiU .must be used"
(Brown, 1978, pp. 136-137). This' keeping in mind' referred to by ,
Gal'peI'in (1969) allows not only for cognitive control but in
particular allows for the subjective sense of meanilkg the students
need.
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Returning to the earlier problem of the students' inability to
relate to the formalization of independenc:~ via P(Af\B)=P(A)P(B),
the students may be assisted in their understanding of independence
by linking the teaching thereof with conditional probability (see
Kelly and Zwiers, 1986) or by making explicit the distinction
):;<:tweenindependent and mutually exclusive events, even though this
may seem trivial to the teacher. In this way more connections
between coneept ions are made explicit, aud studenbs are more able
to sense the meaning of independence subjectively but accurately.
6.16 A Metacognitive Orientation and Relationships
A mdacognitive orieJ1tation will present a challenge to existing
power ~clations between some teachers and students, for the teacher
who is focusing on how he or she is tv facilitate the student in
acquiring expertise may threaten his or her own position. There is
a definite sense of satisfaction amongst some teachers to be able
to declare a student tweak' and absolve themselves of further
responsibility.
exists if one
historically, to
However, a completi")ly different power relation
looks at the student at 3 tertiary level
attelnpt to understand the nature of the students'
cognitive abilities and how these may be developed. My contention
is that for students and teachers, metacognition will shift the
power relations to the advantage of the stud~nts' learning, and if
this is our goal, it is surely desirable. If metacognitive
experiences lead one to feel uncomfortable in this regard perhaps a
re-examination of one's goals as a t.eacher are necessary.
Mathematics and related disciplines have been used as a 'sie1~e' to
sort out the cognitively weak from the strong, or so it is
believed. Many students have developed a learned helple: isness by
repeated failure (Miller and Seligman, 1974), or have developed
'inert knowledge'. If it 15 the case that students are gh ing up
because the difficulty of the task is outside their zone of next
development then this aspect clearly needs to be watched and '
recommendations made regarding curricula...
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6.17 The Limits of the Notion and Use of Metacognition
studies concerning zetacognition reflect an important shift toward
viewing both student and teacher as responsible active agents in
the Iearnmg procesa. However, the genera.lity of the approach
cannot be igno~ed. Such generality makes the importance of such an
approach difficult to refute in the learning and teaching of
Probability Theory (in keeping with a Popperian (1959) approach to
theory). My contention is that a )iletacognitiveorientation by
teacher and student can assist in providing the learner with at
least the confidence to know that both teacher and student share
the same goals - that of the student becuming adequately competent
in basic Probability Theory and the so.lvtng of probability problems
and to sense that be or she and the teac1~er are not in opposition
to one another.
Metacognitive knowledge does not simply become awakened during
cognitive functioning, nor does the development of awareness of the
metacogni tive simply lead tCI improved cognttive functioning.
Metacognitiv8 knowledge cannot be ta\'~htwithout some underlying
cognitive skills that will be managed and developed by these
metacognitive skills. A dialectic relationship between bhe
cognitive mid metacognitivp- must necessarily exist in the light ot
the theoretical position that has been developt'i, and this is in
keeping with the findings of research (see Butterfield and Belmont,
1974; Butterfield, Wambold and Belmont, 1973, in Brown, 1978).
Thus teachers and learners need to concentrate on the development
of know12dge, skills and strategies at both the cognitive and
metacognitive levels. However, I have concentrated on the
development of the metacognitive, as there has been less direct
attention paid to this aspect in the lite":."atureon the learning alld
teaching of Probability Theory and because metacognition serves a
unHyin~ function for the three levels of thinking.
A significant diff'iculty with 8.. aetiacognitdve position relates to
assumption6 regarding the nature of understanding. If
understanding is not necessarily tall or nothing', and degrees
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of understanding exist (Mar~ '~, 1981), monitoring this
comprehension becomes difficult and -;f course open to error. There
is sometimes a lack of correspondence between what students say
they could or should do and what they really do. Bakel'and Brown
(1984) claim that the direction of the lack of correspondence is
usu&l1y in the direction of knowing that some st:L'ategyis important
but not uaing it. They make the traditional distinction between
procedural and strategic knowledge, knowing that as opposed to
knowing how, the latter being considerably aore difficult to
examine and describe.
6.18 The Necessity of ~fetacognition
The question arises aid to whether mctacognition is really
necessary. This question can be interpreted in different ways. In
the first. place" it can be seen as questioning whether
metacognition is necessary for effective thinking. Secondly, the
question can be seen as asking whether metacognitive strategies
need to be taught. Thirdly, it can be interpreted in rel8.tion to
the importance of a metacognitive teaching orient~tion. Lastly, it
can be seen to ask whether metacognition is Iss~ntial for cognitive
development.
The first has all~eady been answezed in the affirmative.
Comprehension monitoring is essential but not necessarily conscious
at all times. The second interpretation too has been answered in.
the ~ffirmative b:yemphasising the dialectical nature of scientific
and spontaneous development, of deliberase and incidental learning,
and the internalizing of originally social forms of knowledge by
individual reconstruction. In response to the third
interpretation, it may well be that there are other useful and
effective approaches to the teaching and learning of probability,
but those are not the direct concern of a report on metacognition
in the learning and teaching of probability. The last of the
interpretations of the question, that of ~hether metacognitive .
approaches can lead to structural or qualitative changes , is more
difficult to answer for it raises the question of the role of
metacognition in the broad transfer of cogni.tive abilities, the
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po6sibiHty of which has been ,"lssumecL,An attempt to answer this
empirically would require, at least, thorough knowledge of what is
requirp.d in both teaching metacognition and tests of transfer.
Teachers would need to undertake task analyses in order to assess
what the learning of probability requires in total, a daunting and
difficult task. .It:. full engagement with this issue is beyond the
scope of thil research report.
6.19 Metacognition and Control
The metacognitive approaches vutlined above, those of giving
attention to metacognitive experiences and eliciting self-awareness
are import&nt not only for Probability Theory but also for
increasing students' sense of control over their learning in
general. It may be argued that this is ~erely a deception and that
the use of metacognition is confounding the real lack of control
the students have. It may be that we are merely facilitating the
illusion of control, and that in fact students' and teachers~
thinking processes are controlled by broader social factors, and
that it is twee to think that it can be otherwise while 're&l'
pOWer is maintained elsewhere.
However, if our assumptions regarding Activity Theory are valid and
that society COtnstrains but also enables, then b~ facilitating the
development of strategies in the students and teachers that will
allow them to have» at least, some control over their learning
processes, both groups may enabled to alter circumstances that are
unacceptable. Clearly the roles of teacher and student in 'this
regard are mutually dependent. Facilitating metacognitive
knowledge in the students mn&,t k) accompanied by aebacognd tive
development in the teacher. If the tes.cher attempts to transcend
the barriers created by not only the disjunctures evident in the
teaching and learning of probability itself but in the broader
societal context, that is the disjunctures created by insensitivity
to the position of others in the society, then in fact
metacognition may assist in enabling both students and teachers and
could result In important changes in tieachfng and learning.
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Clearly in terms of Probability Theory it would mean an entire
reappraisal of the role of Probability Theory for service-course
students, and how that reappraisal would affect what the students
learn and teachers teach, and how and where this takes place. In
that probability, notions form the basis of inf,'rential statistics,
and that statistics is a widely used wid often abused tool in
society, I believe that good critical teaching of probability is
very importa.llt.
It is doubtful whether the curriculum (used in the broad sense) can
remain unaltered if a metacognitive orientation is assuRed that
puts teachers and students ton the same side' of the mastery of
knowledge" particularly for service-courses. As Bishop (1985)
states "[r]ecognition of the social construction of phenomen~ leads
me to propose a new orientation for mathematics education. This
orientation views mathematics classrooB teaching as controlling
the organisation and dynamics of the clasRroom for the PUrposes of
!?;~jaringand developing .Nathe.aticsl aeaning" (p.26) • He cla.ims
that this has desira.ble features for practice in the clusroom
including; emp~Hl!&isingthe dynamic interactive nature of te~ching;
stressing the learner as well as learning; recognizing the
notion of shared knowledge, content and context; taking into
account pupils existing knowledge, abilities and feelings; taking
account of the cognitive and affective aspects of the developmental
process a.nd emphasiZing the development of filathematicalmeaning.
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
I have argued that Probabili ty Th(~oJ:'Yis a unique discipline
attempting t(.1 impose certainty upon uncertainty, changing
ill...structured problems into puzzles. It is essential that the
epistemic nature of probabiUty be (kept in mind' during cognitive
action with the content and processes involved in probability. It
is metacognition that can serve to unify the aspects of cognition,
metacognition, and epistemic ~ognition.
Beginning witch problems encountered by atudent.a and teachers,
deriving from my own
Probability Theory,
exper-Ience in the learning and teaching of
I hh}othesized that students were often
overwhelmed by feelings of helplessness and meaninglessness in
tackling novel (in the sense of being new to them) probability
problems and had become heavily reliant on algorithmic approaches.
Some students were unabl~ to synthesize across knowledge bases by
abstractions to a higher level of generalization, and un~ble to
synthesize across different types of knowledge or across different
components of the system of probability knowledge. Thus they were
unable to detect fundamental inconsistencies, for example, the
returning of probability values greater than 1 when they could
easily say that probability values range between 0 and 1, and could
not identify two seemingly different approaches as being
fundamentally the same (see chapter 1). In addition, it became
clear that giving students more knowledge when they were struggling
with systematizing the'ir knowledge served only to make them less
efficient in problem-solving than before.
The most perplexing problem was that students gave up l:l'yingto
learn probability as they were unsure of t.heir ability to do so.
Teachers also were insecure about their ability to, help the
students to become proficient probability problem solvers, while
others seemed not to care. In general there was a sense of lack of
control over the learning process in this field and 11 consequent
lack of confidence on the part of both students and teachers in
their ability to change this. An outcome of this was that students
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and teachers lIlerel:ytried to get problems tdone', rather than focus
on their goals.
Placing the lea.t"ningand teaching of Probability Theory within the
them:etical aasuapt.Ions underlying the Theory of Activity assisted
in explaining why these problems occur. Firstly, Activity Theory
t"ocuses our understanding on intentionality in activity. Analyzing
the goals of learning and teaching in Probability Theory raises the
generalization that teachers and students were both aiming at the
student gaining some probabilistic skills, and in addition,
fostering independent problem-solving abilities in the students.
Hence the student becomes the subject of educational activity, and
the teacher becomes the link between the social knowledge of
Probability Theory, existing ill the broader culture, and the
student'B internalization of that knowledge. The te~cher is at the
interface of external knowledge and its i.,ternalhation by the
student. The relationship between the teacher and student thus
becomes primary in educational activity, and the students and
teachers need to percei've that they share the same goals.
In the use of Activity Theory, co~~itive activity is ontologically
Inseparahle from affect which gives act ivat Ion weight to
superschemes that control cognitive process-structures. Hence it
is necessary that we give consideration to the affective aspects of
the learning and teaching process within this educational
relationship. In particular, this study has looked at the
importance of confidence, the knowledge of the ability to learn
probability. Metacognitive experience was seen as the
consciousness of this capability of learning probability.
The notion of shared situation definition was invoked, that the
expert and novice, by communication, must come to an
intersubjective position in order to overcome the phenomenological
chasm h~~othesized to exist between those who have knowledge of a
system and its structures and processes and those who are in the
early stages of internalization, that of active engagement with the
subject. Mediation becomes the motive force for development.
pt1.ge74
Internalization must occur no.t"only in relation to actual content
matter but also in relation to the interrogatory functions of the
teacher. Internalization includes the internalization of
responsibility, where the responsibility for student learning must
be transferred to the stUdent as pa.rt of student dflvelopment. The
learner has to internalize the Ianguage-gaae of probability,
including self-reflection and self-regulation. Both these aspects
can be seen as part of metacognition, which unites conscioUl'lness
and control, consciousness and control being complementary sides of
the same phenomenon.
The present and future interact in the learning and teaching
relationship, creating the Zone of Proximal Development within
which learning triggers development. With regard to Probability
Theory, we have seen that an approach that begins with students'
present knowledg~ may be inappropriate because misconceptions are
coaaon, Wh; is required is,rather that scientific concepts are
taught which do not necessarily link with present knowledge. As
these everyday and scientific concepts themselves develop, they
allow for the reconstruction of knowledge, facilitating the
development of true concepts, those that hold personal meaning for
the students and are in addition objectively part of statistical
practices. The deve.lopaenti required is that of the mastery of
methods of a::quiring knowledge; metacognition regulates this
process.
Metacognition, if deliberately taught, can be seen as the
'scientific' aspect of the teaching and learning of probability.
Intuitive learning will take place though imitation and corr~ction;
but, more powerfully, learning with control and consciousness can
take place with a metacognitive orientation where the knowledge,
monitoring and regulation of cognitive activities takes place.
Metacognition in this study has become the meta-level wherein the
teachers have to become conscious not only of their own thinking
processes, and those of the stUdents', but also how to organize
teaching in order to facilitate student development by means of
reflection on their own thinking processes as well as those of the
teachers.
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For the teb.cber, tbis will involve showing students how to
generalize» to extract essence, to interconnect, to make
relationships explicit, and so on. For example teachers can make
explicit the difference between ~utually exclusive events and
independent events, even though this may seem trivia.! for them.
The~ have to suspend egocentric judgements and actions. It
requires that the teacher re$pond to the abilities of the students
in terms of the amount of responsibility they are able to assume at
their existing level of development, and in general, by mediation,
to provide the motive force for student development, encouraging
students to reflect upon their own de~elopment as both the subject
and object of educational activity.
Metacognitive experience can be used as a tool for the development
of this awareness. Wh~re repeated failure, and its conSequent
anxiety or withdrawal of consciousness, has been seen to lead to a
lack of confidence, a positive role for failure has been found in
this study, for these affective experiences themselves can be used
to monitor future progresa ,
A metacognitive orientation, then, reflects an important change of
emphasis in teaching, unifying motives and goals with actions.
Teachers accepting the tbeoretical positions outlined in this
report must assume a develcpmental approach to teaching and
leerning rather than an approach which passively accepts students'
present abilities. It places the responsibility for student
learniug on both teacher and learner, but that these
responsibilities change emphasis during internalization, with the
teachers initially providing more support to compensate for
insecurities, by providing external sources of confidence, on the
assumption that the students will all acquire what is expected of
them.
It requires that the goals of
students' sense of the meaning
consideration of the students'
educational activity include.the
of probability, as well as a
knowledge of their own ability to
reflect on and acquire probability knowledge ~ both content and
processes.
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Practical suggestions regarding methods include teachers extending
students' metacognitive knowledge bases, for example by
articulating that seemingly different statements may be saying the
same thing. Teachers may articulate their own thinking as object~
of thought to enable students to see the processp.s involved in
reaching a suitable method or model for a problem. Teachers can
highlight aspects that are important, mediating a framework by
which students CWl apprehend probability knowledge. If teQchers
can, by task analyses, deconstruct the processes involved in
abbreviation, they will allow students gr~ater control over the
learning processes and facilitate transfer. These are major tasks,
and a comprehensive description of them is clearly bey-nne;.!le scope
of a report such as this. But if teachers and atudenvs can get
closer to knowing their strengths and limitations, knowing their
repertoire of strategies and where they are appropriate, knowing
how to plan, i.mplement, monitor and regula.te cognitive activities,
within a context of knowledge of the complexities of probabilistic
knowledge, they will be closer to effective teaching and learning
of Probability Theory, .which itself can become automatized. In a
sense they will be invoking an epistemic level in assessing the
possibility that their goals can be reached and devising methods of
materializing these.
The strength of my argument lies finally in teachers' and learners'
cOll!Dlitmentto their goals, and their metacognitive knowledge that
they, the teachera, can help students learn, and that they, the
students, can help themselves to UBe teachers as a resource in an
institutional setting so that they eventually become their own
teachers. The injunction emerges that one may not dismiss learning
difficulties in the students as limitations of their capacity until
more is understood about learning and teaching and what the student
brings to the learning situation in terms of knowledge bases of a
specific discipline. Using the concepts of consciousness and
control is important in order to take action towards improving
teaching and learning in a situation where present methods are not
adequate.
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To conclude I quote Narode (1987, p.26), who wTites of a
metacognitive orientation:
"Generally both the student and the teacher learn from the
interaction, and while content kno~:edge may elude th~
student's long term memory, hopefully the metacognitive
orientation will remain.
Meaningfulness and cQnfidence must become units of wlalysis of good
teach.ng.
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Endnotes
1 This is especially pertinent for the introduction of
Probability Theory into the high scheel syllabi.
2 Some of Vygotsky's central works on activity are not yet
available in English.
3 For example, Loaov (1982, p. 58) contests the validity of
applying the ~._eory of Activity to individual psychological
processes rather than giving primacy to the fabric of social
rela.tions.
4 Rubenstein (cf. Kozulin, 1986, Leont'ev, 1979) contested that
the levels could be split off from each other, claiming that
both goals and motives operate at the level of both action and
activity. However, Rubenstein concedes that their theories can
be seen to correspond. LeoD:t'ev on the other hand, accedes to
the notion of different lev~ls of goals.
5 'Meaningful' in the WRY used by Craig (1985, p.91), in the
sense of conceptions of what probability ought to entail.
6 See oection on the development of concepts.
1 'Novel' is used here in the sense of 'new for the student'.
8 Wertsch (1979) worked with mothers and children, but I have
al"gued that· an analogous situation obtains between teacher and
lea.rner or expert and novice.
9 Craig (1985) corroborates this interpretation.
10 Citing Schoenfeld and Lesh.
11 Vygotsky's view of consciousness is of course considerably more
complex than this.
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APPENDIX 1
Quotes from students' writing on the course Quantitative
Techniques I, University of the Witwatersrand, 1989.
student 1: "Reading notes is like an escape frail the
practicality and.brutal character of the course".
Student 2: "••• there is a lack of
reinforce the theory that
initiative on my part to
I have acquired from the
notes. •••The simplicity of the notes therefore lUre
(sic)
(sic)
have
me into indolency and ultimately condemn me
misjudgement. To date it is unfortunate that I
not yet found a diagnosis treatment to this
predicament
approach to
spend. more.
enslavement. In conclusion, my
the course is a.duplex one. I therefore
time not doing my work but trying to
rationalise, iron-out and subdue this (gross
di:screpency (sic) between. the notes and the
prillcticalities of the course examples and
aplt)l:i.cations)pernfeious in'consistencies."
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